Compendium on development cooperation strategies 2007. Development DE 138, October 2007 by Michel, Louis
European Commission
Directorate-General for Development
and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States
Post Address
Rue de la Loi 200
B-1049 Brussels
Fax:
+32 2 299 25 25
E-mail: 
DEV-A4-FMB@ec.europa.eu
Internet: 
http://ec.europa.eu/development
D
E
V
E
L
O
P
M
E
N
T
Compendium
on development
cooperation 
strategies 2007
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
DE 138
OCTOBER 2007
Louis Michel
European Commissioner 
for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid
C
o
m
p
e
n
d
i
u
m
 
o
n
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
c
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
e
s
2
0
0
7
N
H
-
7
8
-
0
7
-
3
3
6
-
E
N
-
CThis brochure has been published in English and French  
by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Development and 
Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available 
on the Internet. This can be accessed through the Europa server
(http://europa.eu/)
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities, 2007
ISBN: 978-92-79-06609-2 
© European Communities, 2007
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Belgium, October 2007
European Commission
Compendium on development cooperation strategies 2007
Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities
2007 – 104 pp. – 148 x 210 mm
ISBN: 978-92-79-06609-2 Compendium
on development
cooperation 
strategies 2007Louis Michel
European Commissioner 
for Development and
Humanitarian Aid| 3 Foreword
This publication is Volume Two of the European Union's "Compendium on
development cooperation strategies".
In 2006, as you recall, the European Commission's Directorate-General for
Development and Relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific States
published a firstvolume detailing the different measures taken since the start of
my term of office as European Commissioner.  My aim has been to launch a new
concept and framework for the European Union's policy towards development
cooperation and this includes: 
> The European Consensus on Development.
> Working towards more, better and faster European Union aid. 
> The European Union Strategy for Africa.
> Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership. 
> Governance in the European Consensus on Development – 
Towards a harmonised approach in the European Union.
This 2007 edition updates the compendium by reproducing six more recent
communicationsfrom the European Commission to the Counciland the European
Parliament, details of which can be found in the  Table of Contents. 
Reading theses will give you a better picture of how the European Union is going
about its task and is literally revolutionizing its policy on development.
Eradication ofpovertyisstillthe main challenge for the coming years. Itisour duty
to rise to this challenge in  terms of justice and human solidarity. We can assure
the European public that we will spare no effort as we continue in the energetic
and enthusiastic pursuit of this crucial goal.
Louis Michel4 |
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1.1. Policy framework
On 20 March 2006, the European Commission outlined at the 11
th Summit of
Heads of State and Government of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on
Development) an initial blue print of a strategy for peace, security and devel-
opmentfor the Horn ofAfrica region. ThisCommunication translatesthe mutual
interestand politicalwillto generate regionalstabilityand solidarityand isthe
product of high-level consultations that have taken place since then, involving
allthe IGAD countriesand other interested regionalplayerssuch asthe League
of Arab States and Egypt. 
This Communication builds on two important Strategies already being imple-
mented by the EU: the ‘European Consensus for Development’ adopted by the
European Parliament, the Counciland the Representativesofthe Governments
of the Member States meeting within the Council and the Commission on
20 December 2005(
1) and the ‘EU-Africa Strategy’ approved by the European
Council on 15-16 December 2005. The former provides an overarching policy
frameworkgeared to achieving povertyreduction and sustainable development
by following a comprehensive prevention-based approach to state fragility,
supporting conflict prevention and resolution, and building peace. The latter
underpins EU policy towards Africa by pointing out that “issues such as peace
and security, migration, interconnection or disaster management require pri-
marily regional or continental responses” and stressing the need to “develop
a comprehensive approach to conflictprevention, which seeksto integrate poli-
cies and action in the fields of security, development and democratic govern-
ance. The EU should increasingly use regional and national development
strategies and instruments to address structural causes of conflict.”
Security and development are important and complementary. Without peace
and security, development and poverty eradication are not possible, and with-
out development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur.
This central assumption which underscores the EU-Africa Strategy is particu-
larly relevant in the Horn region. The Horn of Africa is one of the most con-
flict-prone regions in the world as well as one of the poorest. The protracted
border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Somalia crisis and the
(1) OJ (OJ C 46, 24.2.2006, p. 1).
| 9 Introduction10 |
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Sudanese and Northern Uganda conflictsallhave an impacton the livelihoods
of millions of people moving the region away from the Millennium
Development Goals' (MDGs).
On the basis of this policy framework, the European Commission is now pro-
posing to set up a ‘RegionalPoliticalPartnership’ with the Horn of Africa(
2), as
a test case for applying the EU-Africa Strategy.The main objective of the
Communication is to contribute to reducing the region’s instability, which is a
prerequisite for reaching the MDGs. It sets out a comprehensive approach to
conflict prevention in the Horn of Africa, tackling in the short to medium term
the root causes of instability at both country and regional level and strength-
ening regionalcooperation. Itshould guide EU externalaction in the region and
the formulation of Country and Regional Strategy Papers.
1.2. Why the Horn of Africa is of strategic importance to the EU
A prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region is in the interests of the
countries and peoples of both the Horn of Africa and the EU. However, an
uncontrolled, politically neglected, economically marginalised and environ-
mentally damaged Horn has the potential to undermine the region’s and the
EU’s broad stability and development policy objectives and to pose a threat to
European Union security. 
The EU isthe mostimportantdevelopmentpartner in the Horn region. Itisalso
one ofthe main providersofhumanitarian assistance. Socio-economicvulner-
ability and inequities, shortcomings in the human and social rights field,
chronic food insecurity, competition for scarce natural resources, poor govern-
ance and population growth are underlying features that EU stability and
poverty reduction policies, together with regional and international partners,
seek to address. Stability in the Horn of Africa is also strategically crucial for
EU security. Cross-border dynamics, such as illegal migration and trafficking
of arms, drugs and refugee flows, are factors contributing to instability and
tensions that spread throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond, and could
even reach the EU. The Horn has come under increased international scrutiny
in the war against terrorism due to the spreading of religious extremism and
ideologicalinfluencesfrom neighbouring sub-regions. Prevailing insecurityin
the region has also contributed to a culture of lawlessness, banditry, and
(2) Defined in thisCommunication asincluding allIGAD countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya,
Somalia, Sudan, Uganda.| 11 Introduction
warlordism. As a result the boundaries between political conflict, criminality
and terrorism tend to be blurred.
The EU has also strong economic interests in having a stable Horn of Africa. It
adjoins strategically important parts of the Middle East: it flanks the Red Sea
waterway, which is crucial for EU trade and supplies, particularly energy; it is
a neighbour of Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer ; it straddles the
Nile basin, which isofcentralimportance to Egypt(whose stabilityin turn isan
important element of Mediterranean and Middle East stability); and it is in
close proximity to countries covered by the EU Neighbourhood policy, both in
North Africa and the Near East.. Also, the EU is the key international trading
partner of the region and there is potential for EU economic interests to grow,
if energy supplies and economic growth in the region continue to rise and are
adequately managed. 
It is important to note that other countries, notably the US, China and India
have taken an interest in the strategic importance of the Horn and are invest-
ing significant resources there.12 |
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2. Regional dimension and dynamics
2.1. Regional interconnections
The Horn region has particularly complex regional, political and cross-border
dimensions. These include the confluence ofBantu/Nilotic, Arab, Egyptian and
Abyssinian cultures; the large number ofwarsover secession, autonomyor ter-
ritorial claims (many of them related to ethnic or religious identity), control of
resourcesand disputed borders; the regionalimpactsofpopulation growth, cli-
mate change and related pressureson naturalresources; the friction fuelled by
competition for the water resources from the Nile; the high proportion of
nomadic pastoralists, bound largely by ethno-linguistic ties rather than polit-
icalborders, who are among the mostmarginalised groupsin the region; a cul-
ture of militarism and certain vested interests in war economies; and the
neglect, underdevelopment and insecurity of border areas in the region. All
these factors contribute to instability, conflict, poverty and poor governance,
and require regional solutions with cross-border and transnational compon-
ents that complement appropriate national responses.
The Horn faces not a series of separate conflicts, but a regional system of
insecurityin which conflictsand politicalcrises, feed into and fuelone another.
The currentpoliticaland ideologicalenvironmentin the Horn ofAfrica givesrise
to growing polarisation and an entrenched faultline ofinstabilitythatstretches
from Darfur to southern Somalia and has a negative impact on the region as a
whole. Regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and IGAD play a
key role in finding sustainable solutions to the challenges the Horn of Africa
faces. Annex I provides an over view of the existing regional architecture.
An overview of some of the most important regional interconnections of the
larger conflicts in the region is provided in Annex II. The following conclusions
can be drawn:
• Mostofthe bordersare unstable, border regionsare prone to conflictofone
kind or another and there are a number of contested borders;
• Most of those countries which share a common border also have, or have
had in the recent past, difficult inter-state relations which can lead to
violence; Regional dimension and dynamics
• In all of the larger conflicts in the region, there is evidence of states provid-
ing refuge, rear bases, military support and diplomatic recognition to
groups fighting wars in neighbouring states.
These regional interconnections have manifested themselves in several ways: 
• A major recentpoliticaldevelopmenthasbeen the rapprochementbetween
Sudan, Eritrea and the emerging Islamic Courts in Somalia;  
• The Ethiopia-Eritrea tensionshave spillover effectsnotonlyalong the com-
mon border but also in the internal politics of each country and in the con-
flicts in Somalia and Sudan;
• Ethiopia has had or continues to have complex relations with many of its
neighbours;
• The existing instability in Darfur and southern Somalia has been fuelled by
international factors and has implications on neighbouring countries and
regions.
2.2. Regional cross-cutting issues
There are a number of important cross-cutting issues common to the crises in
the Horn.
Governance and security: A crucial issue in reducing instability in the Horn of
Africa is to address the mutually reinforcing connections between insecurity,
poverty and governance. At the heart of this relationship are communities
which feel marginalised in the national distribution of power, wealth and
access to natural resources, social services, security and justice. These com-
munities may over time develop grievances that can lead to violent rebellion.
Conflicts in the Horn can be exacerbated by powerful networks of state and
non-state actors, such as warlords and the business community, who benefit
from war economies – including arms, drugs and human trafficking networks
- which they to some extent control and who thus have an interest in maintain-
ing the status quo, thereby increasing the marginalisation of communities and
the manipulation ofethnicgroupings. In addition, instabilityand conflictin the
Horn ofAfrica and the violation in some casesofuniversalrightshave been per-
petuated by the lack of political space for the peaceful resolution of conflicts,
byauthoritarianism and militarism, and bythe interference ofexternalpowers.
| 1314 |
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Religiousfundamentalism: Religious fundamentalism is becoming an increas-
ingly important regional issue in view of: (i) weakstate institutions in the Horn
thatmake the region a targetfor fundamentalistgroups; (ii) grievanceswrought
by poverty and conflicts that make the region a potential breeding ground for
religious extremism and activism; and (iii) the influence on the region of
extremist fundamentalist ideology particularly from certain parts of the neigh-
bouring Middle East. 
Migration, refugeesand InternallyDisplaced Persons(IDPs):The Horn ofAfrica
is one of the regions with the highest number of migrants and refugees in the
world. Every country in the region is severely affected, as a source of
refugees/migrants, as a transit or destination or both. IDPs remain particularly
vulnerable and are numerically the most important group, and have also to be
factored in as part of the development and insecurity equation. This crisis,
which has very strong regional political and security dimensions, is an indica-
tor ofpoliticalmarginalisation and exclusion and isa source ofregionalinstabil-
ity fuelling the development of inter-state tensions. Refugees are, moreover,
vulnerable to exploitation bytraffickersand criminal/terroristnetworks. Human
trafficking to Gulf countries, involving not only refugees but also marginalised
and poor communities and the fact that the region is a major entry route to
Europe are significant issues. 
Proliferation and misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW): The prob-
lem of proliferation and misuse of SALW is acute throughout the Horn. Wide
availability and flow ofSALW is partly a consequence of past and present wars
in the Horn and in the neighbouring regions (along with third states providing
arms to opposition/rebel groups), and is a factor contributing to the presence
ofwarlords, militias, criminalnetworks, armed crime and violence in the region.
It also serves as an enabler of terrorism. 
SALW and other trafficking in the Horn have strong inter-regional and global
dimensions. Large-scale trafficking of arms thrives between the Horn of Africa
and the Great Lakes Region, Central Africa, North Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula. Consequently, trafficking in MANPADS and other highly sensitive
arms across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has become a major focus for sev-
eral EU Member States.Regional dimension and dynamics
Security of border areas: Insecurity and underdevelopment of border and
peripheralareasare keyelementsofregionalinstability. Bordersare permeable
and often allow for high levelsofinsecurity, smuggling/trafficking, violence and
environmental degradation. 
Competition for access to Natural resources such as water, timber and non-
timber forest products, fish and fertile land, further negatively impacts on
human security in the region, particularly when coupled with population
growth and the marginalisation of remote areas. The impact of desertification
and climate change will further exacerbate the pressure on natural resources.
Access to limited water and environmental protection of water resources have
a particularlyimportantregionaldimension because the main river basin in the
region, the Nile, is a trans-boundary resource shared by ten states, including
five of the seven countries of the Horn. Other important trans-boundary rivers,
which flow from Ethiopia into Somalia and Kenya, are the Shabelle, Juba and
Omo. There are potential regional tensions relating to sharing of the waters of
the Nile, particularly between Egypt and up-river riparian states. 
Structural food insecurityisalso a concern, affecting mostlynomadicpastoral-
ists(
3) and agro-pastoralists. Depletion ofnaturalresources, drying-outofwater
holes and degradation of pasture areas, are all causes of ethnic tensions and
conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Food insecurity has both cause and effect impli-
cations for regional stability. Tackling the political roots of food insecurity is of
strategic importance in order to break a vicious cycle of instability generating
hunger and vice-versa. 
Pastoralism: The Horn has a high number of transhumant and cross-border
pastoralists, whose communities are often marginalised and alienated. Poor
policies have stimulated or tolerated violent conflict amongst pastoralists or
between pastoralists and other segments of the population. Pastoralists have
been drawn into trafficking, rebellions and increasing levels of violent conflict. 
The relation between pastoralist and agro-pastoralist is also critical, with
access to land, water and other natural resources vital for agriculture a source
of tension.
| 15
(3)  Agriculture also plays a major role in food security, in countries like Ethiopia for example, and
although more of national interest, it has some regional aspects, namely trade-related, which
cannot be neglected.16 |
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(4) In line with the EU Conceptfor strengthening African Capabilitiesfor the Prevention, Management
and Resolution of Conflicts (July 2006).
A significant cross-cutting issue aggravating all these factors is the dem-
ographicupsurgein the region (AnnexIIIandIV). The IGAD region todaycounts
a population of 195 million people; this is estimated to be as high as 480 mil-
lion people in the year 2050, representing 25% ofAfrica’stotalpopulation. This
rapidly growing population further increases pressure on limited natural
resources and represents a challenge to the region’s development and stability.
3. A work programme for regional action
The work programme addresses the key regional challenges outlined above,
focusing on concrete actions and initiatives that need to be taken in order to
achieve greater regional political stability. 
3.1. Encouraging effective regional political and economic
cooperation and integration
Increasing the capacity and political commitment of the AU, IGAD and other
sub-regional organisations to play a key role in regional stabilisation is a high
priority in the regional partnership. The EU enhanced partnership with the AU
and sub-regional organisations should include the following measures:
1. Enhancement of political and functional cooperation with IGAD by the
development of a joint vision and implementation plan focusing on three
main areasofcooperation: (i) peace, securityand governance; (ii) pastoral-
ism and food security, and (iii) institutional development.  
2. Active involvement of the AU in the Horn and the strengthening of African
Capabilities(
4), particularly in building capacities for conflict prevention,
conflict mediation and deployment of military peacekeeping and monitor-
ing operations. The establishment of the Eastern African Standby Military
Brigade (EASBRIG) as part of the African Standby Force is a positive devel-
opment in building capacities for the deployment of military peacekeeping
and monitoring operations, and the EU could consider support to this ini-
tiative as well as building the capacity of the Secretariat of the AU Peace
and Security Council.| 17 A work programme for regional action
3. Fostering of regional integration in the Horn of Africa, interalia through the
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. COMESA and the
East Africa Community (EAC) are key vehicles for regional integration and
should certainly be part of any long-term strategy for building peace in the
region. In EC regional and pan-African programmes, particular emphasis
will be placed on infrastructure and communications as strategic vehicles
for regional integration in line with the Africa Strategy.
In the context of the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership, the EU will
develop infrastructure and related services as well as interconnections
within the Horn and between African regions.
4. In December 2005, the European Council agreed to support African efforts
to monitor and improve governance, and to develop a Governance
Initiative to support national reforms triggered by the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM). Severalcountriesin the Horn region (Ethiopia, Sudan,
Kenya and Uganda) have alreadyadhered to the APRM, and supportfor the
implementation ofreformsshould be provided through the EU Governance
Initiative.
3.2. Addressing the key country-level strategic political issues which
have regional ramifications
This part of the work programme prioritises the major strategic country-level
political issues which could potentiallyhave the most serious regional impact.
A selected number of issues and regional priorities are identified below, and
could be considered as items for EU political dialogue with the Horn of Africa.
1. In Sudan, regionalsupportersand opponentsofthe peace process(es) and
their interests should be identified and factored into dialogue and cooper-
ation. Particular attention should be paid to the regionalimplicationsofthe
Darfur crisis.
2. Cross-border state support for armed groups should be put on the polit-
ical/diplomatic agenda of the EU and the countries of the Horn region.
3. There should be engagement with initiatives aimed at finding solutions to
border demarcation issues, particularlyin relation to the Ethiopian/Eritrean18 |
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border which has broader implications for the region. The normalisation of
relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia is crucial for peace and stability in
the Horn.
4. The political approach towards Kenya and Djibouti should be developed
and reviewed, taking into account their role in regional stability.
5. For regional stability, “containment” cannot be considered as an option
in Somalia; instead, the underlying causes of instability in Somalia need
to be addressed. The concerns of Somalia’s neighbouring countries
should be taken into account and these countries should play a positive
and stabilising role in the Somali peace process. Anchoring Somalia in
the regional partnership will be a ‘test case’ for its effective implementa-
tion (see Annex V).
6. The northern Uganda peace process should take the regional dimensions
of the conflict into account, particularly as regards southern Sudan.
3.3. Addressing regional cross-cutting and cross-border concerns
in the Horn of Africa
There are several important cross-cutting and cross-border issues that need to
be addressed in a systematic way. The Communication proposes EU regional
action in three interrelated pillars and outlines in Annex VI policy responses to
achieve the following objectives:
1. Improved governance and security and enhanced engagement with
Political Islam and dialogue between societies/cultures.
2. Enhanced development, trade, securityand politicalparticipation, particu-
larly in ‘border regions’ and management of migration and refugees and
prevention of trafficking and SALW proliferation.
3. Improved policies and programmes to address competition in natural
resources including development of regional food security strategies and
reduce pastoralist-related conflict, enhanced governance and co-operative
management of freshwater resources. An enabling environment for a successful partnership
4. An enabling environment
for a successful partnership
Successful implementation of the measures described in this Communication
requires concerted and coordinated action on the part of the EU and IGAD
Member Statesaswellasflexibility, responsivenessto dynamicsituationsand
innovative use of available instruments to create incentives for political
change. Moreover, this regional political partnership will evolve dynamically,
with regular revision and development of common policies and programmes.
It will thus make substantial demandson EU/IGAD capacitiesfor coordination,
policydevelopmentand programme implementation and the following accom-
panying measures are proposed.
4.1. Proposed EU accompanying measures
• Promote information-sharing and consultation between EU Member States
and EU institutions with a view to developing a shared understanding and
common approaches as regards the Horn of Africa.
• Maintain and develop effective use of existing EU instruments to support
improved coordination and dialogue, including Troika missions, joint EU
Council/Commission missions and EU Special Representatives. In particu-
lar, the EU could promote the International Partners Forum (IPF) as a forum
for dialogue with IGAD.
• Make full use of Article 8 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement to facili-
tate and advance dialogue with keyactors(nationalgovernments, regional
organisations). The EU should ensure that Article 8 political dialogue will
include a strong focus on regional issues, in particular the regional impli-
cations of actions by individual states. 
• Promote the micro and meso levelofconflictprevention, managementand
resolution, including non-state actor structures.
• Include discussion of relevant Horn of Africa issues in talks and contacts
with key stakeholders in the wider African and Arab region, particularly
Egypt, the Arab GulfStates, the League of Arab States and Central and East
Africa.
| 1920 |
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• Enhance dialogue and coordination on the Horn of Africa with the USA,
Norway, Japan, Canada, Russia and China. In addition, there should be
structured dialogue with the UN and relevant agencies.
• Strengthen the mainstreaming of 'human security' approach including
human and social rights and gender, demographic issues and the environ-
ment (water, coastal zones and forest sustainable management, desertifi-
cation and adaptation to climate change) into development programmes
and promote integration by the partner strategies in the Horn region.
• Dovetail all EU strategies, policies and programmes geared towards coun-
tries of the Horn of Africa, to ensure that they take appropriate account of
keyregionaland cross-cutting issues, and contribute effectivelyto the EU’s
regional political partnership for the region. In its Country Strategy Papers
for the countries of the Horn of Africa, the EU should place particular
emphasis on the regional context and analysis as well as an assessment
of the root causes of violent conflict.
• When preparing new cooperation strategies with the Horn of Africa and
IGAD, the Commission will dovetail EDF 10 country and regional strategies
(2008-2013) in support of the Regional Political partnership for the Horn
of Africa. Wherever feasible, this will be complemented by support from EU
Member States. Governance, natural resources and food security, educa-
tion and regionalintegration focusing on infrastructure should be the main
areas of cooperation underpinning country and regional strategies.
4.2. Proposed Horn of Africa partners’ accompanying measures
• Debate and promote the regional strategy among Member States, IGAD
Secretariat and other policy organs and relevant regional players and civil
society organisations in order to obtain a coordinated position and adher-
ence on the part of all stakeholders. 
• Regional partners and organisations would have to be open to systematic
dialogue at all levels on key regional challenges, e.g. governance, conflict,
food security, trafficking and resource sharing, security and religious fun-
damentalism, and be engaged in identifying drivers of change.| 21 Conclusion
• Promote information-sharing and clarity of the respective roles of regional
organisations, Horn of Africa partners, neighbouring countries and key
regional stakeholders with a view to developing a shared vision.
• Horn of Africa countries and regional organisations would have to allocate
adequate resources for the dialogue and the work programme, and oper-
ationalise the format for enhanced dialogue with the European Union.
• Horn of Africa partners would have to address sources of conflict and pro-
mote cross-sectoral cooperation such as, for example, the link between
conflicts, share of natural resources, pastoralists and food security.
• Implementrelevantinstitutionalreformsand Member States’ commitments
to enable the IGAD Secretariat to function adequately.
• Review and update the IGAD strategyand complete the IGAD sectoralstrat-
egy on peace and security.
5. Conclusion
This Communication implements the Africa Strategy by introducing an EU
regional political partnership for the Horn of Africa based on an analysis of the
key regional dynamics and problems in the Horn region. The aim of the part-
nership is to promote peace, stability and development in the region. It pro-
vides a political framework for concrete regional initiatives and programmes
and for structured and open dialogue between partners at all levels.
Implementation of the partnership will commence in 2007 and it will be jointly
reviewed after two years to take stock of progress in delivery of the work pro-
gramme and ensure it is updated and dovetailed to the conditions prevailing
in the region.22 |
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ALIVE Africa Livestock
AMCOW African Ministerial Conference on Water
AMESD African Monitoring for the Environment
and Sustainable Development
APF African Peace Facility
AU African Union
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
COMESA Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO Civil Society Forum 
DDR Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration
EAC East Africa Community
EASBRIG Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
EC European Commission
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
EU European Union
FRUD Front pour la Restauration de l’Unité 
et de la Démocratie (Djibouti)
ICG International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPF IGAD Partners Forum
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
MANPADS Man Portable Air Defence System
6. List of abbreviations| 23 List of abbreviations
MDGS Millennium Development Goals
NBI Nile Basin InitiativeM
NDA National Democratic Alliance (Sudan)
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OECD/DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/
Development Assistance Committee
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front
RECSA Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons
REFORM Regional Food Security and Risk Management Programme
RPF Regional Political Framework
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SRRC Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSR Security Sector Reform
TFG Transitional Federal Government
TFIs Transitional Federal Institutions
TPLF Tigrean People’s Liberation Front
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European citizens want a stronger Europe, capable of improving the living con-
ditions of the world's poorest. A Europe that delivers more, better and faster
in the fight against global poverty. A more vocal Europe, with a political impact
that matches the level of its financial generosity. 
ButEuropean citizensalso wanta more effective and efficientEurope. Over the
lastdecade, the multiplication ofdevelopmentaid activitiesand structureshas
led to a complex and expensive aid industry. In each developing country there
are, on average, 350 donor missionsper year. Too manydonorsare concentrat-
ing on the same countries and the same sectors. In Mozambique, for example,
there are no less than 27 donors fighting HIV. As a result, developing countries
can often hardlycope with the manymissions, the unnecessaryadministrative
costs, the overlaps and duplications, and the differences in donor require-
ments, rules and conditionalities. This situation reduces transparency and
increases the potential for corruption. Other countries, such as the Central
African Republicor Somalia suffer on the contraryfrom so-called donor fatigue,
leaving them almost entirely up to themselves. 
A consensusisemerging thatthisopaque and complexsituation isnotsustainable
and thatthe European Union (EU) should take the lead in addressing the problem.
The emergence of new EU donors and the pledge to double EU aid has raised fur-
ther awareness that radical improvement is necessary. With the adoption of the
European Consensus for Development in 2005(
1), the EU created a new momen-
tum. For the firsttime ever, the Council, the Parliamentand the Commission agreed
on a setofcommon values, principlesand objectivesfor the EU'sdevelopmentpol-
icy, positioning itasworld leader in development. A few monthslater, in April2006,
the EU agreed on a package of measures to deliver more, better and faster aid. 
Time has come to move from rhetoric to action. Who does what is the essen-
tial question the EU needs to address if it is to make progress in implementing
the EU'snew developmentpolicy. The objective ofthisCommunication isthere-
fore to present a set of concrete measures to enhance complementarity and
division of labour amongst EU donors. To achieve this objective, the EU must
analyse the main challengesand opportunitiesahead (part1) and redefine the
concepts and principles for EU action (part 2). On this basis, the EU should
define a way forward (part 3).
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1. An unprecedented window of opportunity
Complementarity is not a new political issue. International donors and organ-
isationssuch asthe Organisation for EconomicCo-operation and Development,
the United Nations and the World Bankhave a long standing experience in try-
ing to improve complementarity. At European level, the Communications and
CouncilResolutionsof1995(
2) and 1999(
3), manyreports, and variouspilotini-
tiatives indicate the EU's commitment to promote division of labour. The Joint
Policy Statement of November 2000(
4) on Development Policy was the first
attemptto achieve operationalcomplementaritybetween the Commission and
the Member Statesbydefining areasofrecognised added value for Community
assistance. However, manyofthese policyinitiativesfailed to be translated into
field reality because of the political and operational difficulties such an
approach raised.
1.1. The challenges
Politics and visibility. Development cooperation is part of donor countries'
foreign policy toolbox. Donor countries may be reluctant to give up cooper-
ation in a given sector or country, as it may lead to reduced visibility for their
action. Visibility also has a domestic dimension. Parliaments and the public
maybecome reluctantto supportmeasuresto pulloutofdirectlypovertyreduc-
tion-related sectors (e.g. education, children's health).
Operational challenges. An optimal division of labour, even when politically
desired bydonors, stillentailsoperationalchallenges. Experiencesexistwhere
commitmentswere made in partner countriesand where governmentsdid pro-
mote harmonisation processesand division oflabour among donors. Localpro-
cesses, including those often referred to as Joint Assistance Strategies, were
being developed early 2006 in about 15 countries. However, these laudable
(2) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
Complementaritybetween the Community’sDevelopmentCooperation Policyand the Policiesof
Member States, Brussels, May 1995. Resolution of the Council on complementarity between
the Community’s Development Cooperation and Member States' policies and actions, Brussels,
June 1995.
(3) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
Complementarity between Community and Member State Policies on Development
Cooperation — COM(1999) 218, 6.5.1999. Resolution of the Council on complementarity
between Community’s and Member States Development policies, Brussels, May 1999.
(4) Jointstatementon ECdevelopmentpolicybythe Counciland the Commission - November 2000.| 29 An unprecedented window of opportunity
initiatives did not necessarily lead to much practical progress because of the
operational difficulties involved.
Use of existing expertise Any strategy for a division of labour must take
accountofthe significantdifferencesbetween EU donors. Some countrieshave
provided large volumes of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for a long
time. Others have maintained strong cultural and political ties from their
colonial past. Other countries still have only recently started development co-
operation. Every EU donor has specific expertise and can play an active role in
a division oflabour, which should notbe lostbut, on the contrary, fullycapital-
ised upon. Division of labour should not lead to rigid bureaucratic approach
but leave room for flexibility.
1.2. The opportunities
Building on a new globaland European consensus.  In 2005, alldonorssigned
the Paris Declaration underlining the importance of complementarity and the
need to make full use of each other's comparative advantages, while respect-
ing the ownership ofpartner countries. The EU hasgone one step further. In its
contribution to the Paris Declaration, based on the Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Party on Harmonization(
5), the EU agreed to develop an operational
strategy towards complementarity. This commitment was thereafter made an
integral part of the 2005 European Consensus on Development and is a cen-
tral element in the EU Aid Effectiveness Action Plan presented in 2006.
Following this proposal, EU ministers agreed to develop operational principles
on how to better organise the division oflabour in a partner countryor between
countries. The present Communication –progressively elaborated since 2004
over seven presidencies with the participation of experts of the Members
States– should be seen in the light this framework.
The EU: possible leadership, necessary responsibility. This increased
European awareness is linked to its special responsibility, accounting for 52%
of worldwide ODA and 80% of the scheduled scaling up of aid. All EU donors
share common development objectives, a common vision, values and prin-
ciples. This vision, enshrined in the European Consensus on Development,
provides the basis on which to build shared responsibilities. Moreover, on
the ground, the Commission and Member States already have country-level
coordination and constant dialogue. EU joint programming is emerging. The
(5) Endorsed by the Council in November 2004.30 | EU Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy
European Consensushasrecognised budgetand sector support, asa preferred
aid modality, offering an additional opportunity to further promote coordin-
ation, harmonisation and division of labour.
Improving performance.  The EU Donor Atlas has identified the gaps, duplica-
tionsand unnecessaryadministrative coststhatlimitthe impactofaid provided
byEU donorsand increase the burden putthe partner countries. Reinforcing the
complementarity of EU donors’ activities is a key factor in increasing Europe's
performance as a donor of reference.
2. A complex set of intertwined concepts
Complementarity covers a wide range of principles and concepts. The EU must
assess and clarify all these dimensions carefully. Indeed, agreeing on the con-
ceptual framework is a prerequisite for joint action. At this stage, there are no
clear internationally agreed definitions of complementarity, only briefly
sketched by the Paris declaration. It is therefore important for the EU to offer
to the international community the definition of key concepts and principles. 
2.1. The various dimensions of complementarity
Complementarity is a concept of an organisational nature. It must be seen in
terms of donors acting in complete and balanced unison, rather than being
merely an additional planning exercise. Complementarity starts with co-
ordination, but goes much further: it implies that each actor is focusing its
assistance on areas where it can add most value, given what others are doing.
Hence,  complementarity is the optimal division of labour between various
actors in order to achieve optimum use of human and financial resources.
Complementarity can take place in the five following dimensions which, all
interact with each other and must be seen as a whole.
In-country complementarity: as set out above, aid fragmentation leads to an
increased administrative burden and transaction costsin partner countries, dif-
fuses policy dialogue and may misallocate resources. Some, often politically
attractive sectors may receive excessive funding while some other – not less
important– sectorsremain under-funded. The pharmaceuticalpathwaysto pur-
chase drugs in Kenya involving 20 donors through 13 procurement bodies are
a perfect illustration of how irrational the system can turn out (see Annex 7).| 31 A complex set of intertwined concepts
Cross-country complementarity: too many donors focus on some, often suc-
cess, countries, while leaving too often aside other, often fragile, countries.
This tendency leads to an increasing gap between “aid darlings” and “aid
orphans”. Interesting experiences are being developed to ensure a minimum
of international support in countries where partnerships are difficult and
domestic capacity limited. The EU has a special role to play in this respect: The
EC is a global player with global presence, Member States have close linkages
with all developing countries and the EU has formal agreements with almost
all of them.
Cross-sector complementarity: not all donors need to build capacity in all sec-
tors. Some donors have developed specific know-how that should be fully
used. For example, the European Consensus on Development has stated the
sectors and themes where the European Commission should globally focus its
activities on. Other donors have taken full benefit of their comparative advan-
tage at agency level and established priority areas. The EU as a whole should
be able to provide a complete “tool box” of thematic and sector operations,
building on the specific expertise of individual donors.
Vertical complementarity: the emergence of global aid initiatives and of
regional organisations as major actors has established a complexset of devel-
opment assistance layers. There are several areas where similar activities are
undertaken simultaneouslyatthe national(including sub-national), regionalor
international levels. New synergies need to be thought through. For example,
cross-border activities, large-scale projects or capacity building projects are
often planned both at national and regional levels. 
Cross-modalities and instruments complementarity: some initiatives involve a
combination of various modalities or instruments, whose synergies need to be
strengthened. For example, the choice isoften on how to complementgrantswith
loans or private capital flows. Some donors are also specialised in, or have a
favoured type of, modalities or instruments (i.e. budget support, project, tech-
nical assistance, or support to NGOs). 32 | EU Code of Conduct on Division of labour in Development Policy
2.2. Principles for implementation
Ownership. The primary leadership and ownership in country-level division of
labour should first and foremost lie with the partner country government. If
such leadership and ownership do not exist, the EU should advance such a
process. In both cases, the EU should play an active role in promoting comple-
mentarity and division of labour. All initiatives need to be built on existing
processeswhenever possible, and readilytransferred to the governmentwhen-
ever appropriate. The EU should provide capacity building support to partner
countries to enable them to take responsibility(
6).
Impact on aid flows. It is essential that division of labour is not implemented
at the expense of global aid volumes or aid predictability. Increased volatility
can pose major challenges for the recipient country's economy. The scheduled
scaling up of aid provides an opportunity in this context but EU donors should
avoid sudden aid disruption. Policy changes should be introduced in collab-
oration with the partner countries.
EU and donor-wide dimensions. As mentioned above, the EU has a special
responsibility as provider of more than 50% of worldwide ODA. Moreover, the
EU's shared vision and development objectives as well as its common polit-
ical aspirations provide the ideal platform for an enhanced division of labour.
Therefore, the EU has first and foremost to organise its own division of labour.
Thisenhanced EU leadership and complementaritywillalso provide a basisfor
a better international division of labour. The European Consensus on
Development established the principles on how to interact best in those two
mutually reinforcing dimensions.
Comparative advantage and added value. Complementarity should be based
on the comparative advantage of donors in supporting partner governments
(see definition in Annex 2). EU donors should make full use of their respective
comparative advantages to (i) enhance division of labour, (ii) deepen concen-
tration of activities, and (iii) develop delegated cooperation. Comparative
advantage can be found also in sub-sectors or niche themes within sectors.
Examples could be inclusive education within the education sector, fishing
within natural resource management, local administration in public sector
(6)  Conclusions of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States
meeting within the Council on EU guiding principles on complementarity and division of labour
(17/10/2006) — General principles.A complex set of intertwined concepts
reform, etc. The European Consensus defined the roles through which the
Commission willaim to provide added value (paragraphs46 to 55). In addition
to its role as a donor, the Commission has a recognized added value, in devel-
oping strategic policies, promoting development best practices, and in facil-
itating coordination and harmonisation (paragraphs 50 and 51), as well as in
the external dimension of internal Community Policies.
Lead donor and delegated cooperation. Delegated cooperation is a practical
arrangement where one donor (a “lead” donor) acts with authority on behalf
ofone or more other donors(the “delegating” donorsor “silentpartners”). The
practical implementation modalities including those related to the issue of
visibility need to be defined between leading and delegating authorities. The
level and form of delegation vary, ranging from responsibility for one element
of the project cycle (e.g. a particular review) to a complete sector programme
or even country programme(
7).
European Neighbourhood & Partnership Policy (ENP). The ENP aims to build
privileged partnerships with neighbouring countries, using appropriate –
including development – instruments to promote effective management and
implementation. Therefore the ENP and the relevantfinancing instrumentscon-
tain specific provisions for programming EU support at overall, country and
regional levels, for political and sector dialogues, for the mobilization of par-
ticular strengths of the Member States (e.g. through twinning programmes),
and for coordination bythe Commission. In the application ofthe Code to these
provisions, and in accordance with Article 62 of the European Consensus,
appropriate account will be taken of the broader political framework and the
technical nature (approximation to the EU ‘acquis’) of the ENP.
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3. The way forward: a more effective division of labour
Improving complementarityrequireschangesin the attitude ofboth donorsand
recipient countries. It impacts heavily on the planning processes and the long-
term partnerships in countries and in sectors. This will not happen overnight.
A long-term perspective and a multi-stage approach are therefore needed. 
3.1. The approach: pragmatic and informed
Analyse and build on existing experiences. Improved complementarity and
division of labour has been an objective of a number of national development
policiesand isunder way. Lessonscan be learned from good practices, butalso
from those initiativeswhich have not led to expected results (see Annex 3). 
Establish a political mandate.  Development cooperation is based on political
decisions and aid budgets are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Changes are
highly political decisions and work should be guided by a clear political man-
date from the top level. 
Establish appropriate operational modalities. Complementarity is very much
linked to how donors organise themselves in the policy planning, programming
and implementation of development cooperation. Topics covered in on-going
workregarding methodologiesfor aid deliveryinclude the rolesoflead and active
donors as well as delegating partners, joint programming and joint financing
arrangement.
Have a pragmatic approach to implementation. Promoting complementarity
should be based on a pragmatic approach aiming at concrete and tangible
results. The extensive discussions in recent years on in-country complementar-
ity should make an an early implementation possible. As for cross-country and
cross-sector complementarity, further politicaldiscussionsare needed to guide
implementation. At all stages working methods should remain rational, trans-
parent, and well balanced.
Build effective monitoring systems. For the signatories of the Paris declaration,
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) monitoring systemsprovide a good basisfor perman-
ent monitoring of progress. In other countries, existing national systems should
be utilised with as few new systems established as possible. The EU Donor Atlas
and the annualreporting on implementation provide overviewsatEuropean level.The way forward: a more effective division of labour
3.2. The method: a Code of conduct
It is proposed to adopt a Code of conduct that sets out operational principles
with a view to ensuring better division of labour between EU donors. Based on
good practices from the field, it has been drafted in close collaboration with
Member States experts. The Code is embedded in the principles of ownership,
alignment, harmonisation and management by results entailed in the Paris
Declaration as well as the additional objectives and values highlighted by the
European Consensus.
The European Commission will apply this code on the basis of the objectives
and principles laid out in the legal framework applicable to its development
and external assistance policy, namely the Development and Cooperation
Instrument and the European Development Fund.
3.2.1. Nature
The Code is voluntary, flexible and self-policing. It is a 'soft' law to guide pol-
icyand actions, and to encourage consistencywith our commitments. The Code
provides principles and standards applicable to EU development aid but may
be incorporated and form partofanyother similar localor internationalagreed
code of conduct when such a code is developed.
The Code is a dynamic document. It establishes targets, which EU donors will
endeavour to reach progressively. It will be evaluated and revised periodically
as information accumulates through its implementation and the monitoring of
its progress.
The Code isgenericin nature and focuseson broad guidelines. Itiselaborated
on the basis of desired outcomes, rather than a prescriptive set of procedures
to attain those outcomes. This approach allows flexibility for balancing the
need for rapid results with the constraints that some EU donors will face in
implementing those principles.
The Code is directed towards all EU decision-makers who may be engaged in
any form of definition and implementation of development assistance. Their
compliance with the Code is encouraged.
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The Code is a contribution to the international agenda. It is hoped that donors
around the world will find it useful and will want to commit themselves pub-
licly to abiding by it. Governments and donor bodies may want to use it as a
yardstickagainstwhich to judge the conductofthose agencieswith which they
work. And partner countries have a right to expect those who seek to assist
them to measure up to these standards.
3.2.2. Scope
Civil society activities and cooperation with private foundations represent an
important part of the aid delivered in a given country, but enhanced comple-
mentarity between the private and the public spheres belongs to another
debate. Therefore, while fullyacknowledging the importance ofthisdimension,
this Code focuses only on the complementarity between public authorities.
Atthisstage, while referring to the five componentshighlighted above, the pro-
posed Code will mainly focus on the first three dimensions of complementar-
ity, i.e. on division of labour between EU donors and how EU donors can
complement each others’ work (in-country, cross-country and cross-sector). It
willneverthelessreaffirm the need to addressthe remaining dimensionswithin
other relevant contexts.
Finally, this Codes addresses operational complementarity. It does not intend
to touch upon any institutional set up. Nevertheless, further progress on div-
ision of labour implies change and redeployment of activities and working
methodologies, and even potential structural adjustments. They need to be
promoted and sustained by supporting measures.
3.2.3. Principles
It is proposed that the EU donors commit themselves to the following prin-
ciples (further detailed in Annex 1):
• Guiding principle 1 – 
Concentrate their activities in-country on focal sectors
EU donorswillfocustheir activitieson two focalsectorson the basisoftheir
respective comparative advantages. The partner countries will be encour-
aged to play an active role in the identification of the focal sectors. The
European Consensus defined the roles through which the Commission will
aim to provide added value (paragraphs46 to 55). Thisiscompleted bytheThe way forward: a more effective division of labour
Treaty which recognizes the added value in the external dimension of
internal Community Policies. In addition to the two focal sectors, which
should absorb the bulk of available funding, donors can provide general
budget support, where conditions permit to do so, and finance activities
in other areas such as support to civil society, research, or university/
school co-operation.
BOX 1: 
The European Commission CountryStrategyPapers, aslaunched in 2001 and
revised in 2005 define the strategic programming of the Commission's aid
allocation for all developing countries. The concentration of activities and
financialassistance on two sectorsisa keyprinciple ofthese StrategyPapers
and has greatly increased the focus and efficiency of the Commission's
cooperation.
• Guiding principle 2 – 
Redeploy their other activities in-country
EU donors will redeploy aid activities that are not in their focal sectors, by
either remaining engaged through lead-donors arrangements and dele-
gated cooperation/partnerships, redeploying into general budget support,
or exiting in a responsible manner.
a)  Sub Principle 2 a – Lead donorship arrangement
EU donors will seek to establish lead donorship arrangement based on a
substantial mandate.
b)  Sub Principle 2 b – Delegated cooperation/partnership
If a given sector is considered strategic for the partner country or the donor
and there is a financing gap, EU donors may enter into a delegated co-
operation/partnership arrangement with another donor.
BOX 2: 
In South Africa, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) has
delegated the implementation of its support to land reform to Belgium. In
Rwanda, Sweden has delegated the monitoring and auditing of funds in sup-
port to the education sector to the DFID which is providing general budget
support.
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• Guiding principle 3 – 
Ensure an adequate EU presence in strategic sectors
EU donors should ensure that at least one EU donor is actively involved in
each strategic sector considered relevant for poverty reduction. EU donors
will furthermore seekto limit the number of active donors to a maximum of
three per sector by 2010.
• Guiding principle 4 – 
Replicate practices in the cooperation with partner regional institutions
Taking into accountthe increasing/scaling up ofaid volumesand activities
at regional level, the EU donors will apply the above principles of in-
countrydivision oflabour also in their workwith partner regionalinstitutions.
• Guiding principle 5 – 
Establish priority countries
EU donorswillreinforce their geographicalfocus, through a dialogue within
the EU, taking into accountthe broader donor engagement. Asstated in the
European Consensus, Community assistance will remain universal.
BOX 3: 
As an example, the Netherlands have gone through a drastic reduction in the
number of core/priority countries (from over 70 to some 20 priority countries),
by broadly speaking using three selection criteria: (i) poverty level, (ii) macro-
economic performance and (iii) good governance performance.
• Guiding principle 6 – 
Address the "orphans" countries of aid allocations
EU donors will strive to dedicate part of their aid budget to “under funded”
countries. These are often 'fragile states' whose stabilisation hasa positive
spill-over effect for the wider region. 
BOX 4: 
The European Community Humanitarian Office's (ECHO) aid strategy strongly
focuses on forgotten crises. In 2002, ECHO has set as a target to channel 10%
of its funds to forgotten crises. Today this target has been largely achieved.
Already in the course of the year 2004 support totaling €239 million was allo-
cated to forgotten crises (i.e. 42% of total funds).The way forward: a more effective division of labour
• Guiding principle 7 – 
Analyse and expand global areas of strength
EU donors will deepen self-assessments of their comparative advantages.
They should specialise more, while maintaining the diversity of expertise
for the EU as a whole.
The Commission will further develop its expertise and capacities in the
areas where it has comparative advantages, paying particular attention to
building the necessary capacity and expertise at the country level.
• Guiding principle 8 – 
Pursue progress on the vertical and cross-modality/instruments
dimensions of complementarity
EU donorscommitthemselvesto advance on the other dimensionsofcom-
plementarity primarily in the context of relevant international fora and
partnerships.
• Guiding principle 9 – 
Promote jointly the division of labour
EU donors will increasingly rely on joint statements to clarify purpose,
modalities and outcome of division of labour, and achieve greater impact
of EU collective contribution.
• Guiding principle 10 – 
Deepen the reforms of aid systems
EU donors recognize that division of labour will imply real structural
changes, reforms and staffing consequences.
3.2.4. Follow-up
For the reasons set out above, it is proposed that this Code of conduct is first
adopted by the EU and opened in a second stage to all donors willing to join
this good practice. The successful implementation of the Code will depend on
a collective effort by Member States and the Commission and requires clear
instructions. The role of Commission delegations and Member States’ field
offices will be key in its implementation.
The implementation of the Code should be strongly promoted and monitored.
It should be part of an annual debate on the orientation of EU Development
Policy and be based on three elements: an annual sampling of country cases,
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an EU Donor Atlas adapted to a more political use, and the EU Development
Report under preparation. The Code should be reviewed in 2010.
Conclusion
The lackofeffectivenessofdonors' collective inputhasbecome unsustainable.
The EU hasthe dutyto be pro-active in addressing thischallenge. There istoday
a unique opportunity to deliver, in a progressive manner, on the long-standing
commitmentto enhance complementarityand organise a realdivision oflabour
between donors. EU donorsare invited to adoptthe proposed Code ofconduct
and to start immediately the implementation of its principles, both for ongo-
ing and future scaled up activities. The Commission will monitor and evaluate
the status of its implementation through ongoing annual reporting and regu-
lar country samplings.
The EU must now go beyond policy statements and translate words into acts.
Agreements on a division of labour would increase aid effectiveness,
strengthen the role of development co-operation in EU external relations and
contribute to the construction of a European identity based on the values con-
tained in the European Consensuson Development. The EU hasboth the poten-
tial and responsibility to act as an engine for a donor-wide division of labour.| 41
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It is widely acknowledged that Gender Equality is not only crucial in itself but
is a fundamental human right and a question of social justice. Furthermore,
Gender Equality is essential for growth and poverty reduction, and it is key to
reaching the Millennium Development Goals. Nevertheless, gender inequali-
ties are still ingrained in the cultural, social and political systems of many
countries. 
The ECand the EU Member States are key players in the effort to close the gen-
der gap in the developing world. At international level they are signatories to
International Agreements and Declarations supporting Gender Equality(1) (for
allendnotessee AnnexI.). Accordingly, currentEU developmentpolicycontains
a strong commitment to accelerate progress in this important area.
Thus, the European Consensus(2)highlightsthe importance ofGender Equality
in the context of the new aid modalities. While Gender Equality is a common
objective and a common value of the entire EU, the Consensus recognises
Gender Equality as a goal in its own right. Furthermore, the policy document
identifiesGender Equalityasone ofthe five common principles(3)ofEU devel-
opment cooperation. 
In addition, the EU is committed to the equality of women and men, girls and
boysin itsdevelopmentcooperation Agreementswith allgeographicalregions
(4). Furthermore, the ‘Roadmap for Equalitybetween Women and Men’(5)iden-
tifies the ‘promotion of women’s rights and empowerment outside the EU’ as
one of six priority areas (6).
To progress towards greater Gender Equality most Member States and the
European Commission have, hitherto, adopted a twin-trackstrategy. This com-
prises, on the one hand, the mainstreaming of Gender Equality in all policies,
strategies and actions and, on the other, the financing of measures which
directly support women's empowerment (7). 
To adapt this approach to the new aid modalities and to the requirements of
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Commission, together with
UNIFEM (8), organised a major Conference in November 2005 on the theme
“Owning Development: Promoting Gender Equality in New Aid Modalities and
Partnerships”. This Conference reviewed the progress made in eliminating
gender inequality in the developing world, and re-assessed the role of the
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EU in accelerating Gender Equality in the context of changes in the architec-
ture of EU development aid. 
The presentCommunication buildson the outcome ofthatConference, the pol-
icy framework of the European Consensus, and on the practical experience
gained so far. The Communication also responds to the commitments made in
the Roadmap for Equalitybetween Women and Men byformulating an EU strat-
egy to progress towards achieving:
• equalrights(political, civil, economic, employment, socialand cultural) for
women and men, girls and boys;
• equal access to, and control over, resources for women and men;
• equalopportunitiesto achieve politicaland economicinfluence for women
and men.
While the previous 'Programme of Action for the mainstreaming of Gender
Equality in Community Development Co-operation' valid between 2001 and
2006 provided the basis for capacity building within the European
Commission, the present document places Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment firmly in an EU context and is intended to send the strongest
possible signal regarding the importance of Gender Equality in all future EU
development cooperation efforts.
2. Rationale for Gender Equality and 
Women's Empowerment
Women are at the centre of sustainable social and economic development,
poverty reduction and environmental protection. Despite this, gender inequal-
ity is part of the daily experience of a large proportion of the world’s women.
In spite of the complex nature of such inequalities experience has shown that
the following areas are particularly significant in understanding the relation-
ship between the status of women and sustainable poverty reduction.
The role of women in employment and economic activities is often underesti-
mated because most women work in the informal sectors, often with low pro-
ductivity and incomes, poor working conditions, with little or no social
protection. E.g. in Africa women constitute 52% of the total population, con-
tribute 75% ofthe agriculturalworkand produce and market60 to 80% offood.| 45 Rationale for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
The female labour force in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005 was about 73 million,
representing 34 per cent of those employed in the formal sector, earning only
10 per cent of the income while owning 1 per cent of the assets (9). 
Although trade liberalisation has had a positive impact on most economies in
the long term, it may also result in short-term negative consequences for vul-
nerable groupswith poor women being particularlyaffected (10). Differentsec-
tors of the economy can have a crucial impact on Gender Equality: e.g. poor
infrastructure can undermine girls' schooling because of insecure transport or
if the lack of nearby water sources 'forces' the parents to use girls for house
work.
Women’s empowerment is a key aspect of governance. In many countries
women still tend to be marginalized as decision-makers. Legislation ensuring
equal rights (11) for all women and men is critical and must also be accom-
panied byimplementation in order to protectthe fundamentalhuman rightsof
women and also to enhance the reduction of poverty and economic growth. In
conflict situations women have a critical role and should be fully incorporated
into the peace-building efforts, in conformity with UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 (12).
Gender inequalities persist as regards access to education (13). 57% of the
school-age children not in school are girls (14), while almost two thirds of the
world’s illiterate people are women (15). The ability of women and girls to
empower themselveseconomicallyand sociallybygoing to schoolor byengag-
ing in productive and civic activities outside the home is constrained by their
responsibility for everyday tasks in the household division of labour.
In the field of health there are concerns over women’s limited access to basic
health services. In addition, the main area where serious Gender Equality con-
cerns exist is the sphere of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR).
Notonlydoesan increased investmentin SRH supporta basichuman right, but
an increase in the health status of women has positive effects on the overall
economy. Many of the modest gains in women’s health realized in recent
decades are now threatened by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In addition, the
increasing rate of HIV infection among women and girls is a cause for deep
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Gender-based violence both violates women’s human rights and is a serious
obstacle to the achievement of equality, development and peace. Very often
sexual violence is associated with the spread of HIV/AIDS. Trafficking of
women is a crime, which has its roots in widespread poverty, inequality, weak
governance, armed conflicts and lack of protection against discrimination.
A more detailed analysis of gender inequality is set out in Annex II.
3. Progress and Challenges
The European Union has taken important steps to support greater Gender
Equality both within and outside the Union. Gender Equality is becoming a
recognised part of the dialogue with more and more partner countries and is
being incorporated into the EU’s consultations with civil society. This process
has raised the level of awareness of our development partners regarding the
importance ofGender Equalityand women’sempowermentand hassensitised
them in particular to the relation between greater equality and poverty reduc-
tion (17). This process has complemented the considerable progress at coun-
try level in accelerating the achievement of Gender Equality through various
projects and programmes supported by the European Commission and the EU
Member States (18). Throughout the 10th EDF programming exercise, the EC
has placed particular emphasis on gender sensitizing the country strategies.
There has been clear progress also in the area of capacity building both in
Member States and the Commission. (19)
Nevertheless, in spite of this progress, significant challenges remain. First, we
are still far from reaching the MDG targets. In particular, the first gender MDG
deadline ofeliminating gender disparitiesin primaryand secondaryeducation
by 2005 was missed. Secondary school enrolment of girls in relation to boys
averaged 89% in the developing countries. Women still have a smaller share
ofdecentjobsthan men, and one in three women willsuffer some form ofgen-
der based violence in her lifetime. In addition, the MDGs focus on the health
and education aspects of Gender Equality and fail to capture other multifac-
eted dimensions of Gender Equality (20). 
Second, atthe socialand culturallevelthere are importantfactorswhich serve
to slow progresstowardsthe achievementofGender Equality. Thus, traditional
socialstructuresmayoffer onlylimited incentivesfor changing the existing dis-
tribution of power between men and women, especially to those with a vested
interest in maintaining the status quo. This may go some way to explainingProgress and Challenges
why specific gender-related actions are not always regarded as high priority
and why, in most country strategies, gender is a subsidiary issue (21). 
Again, despite the considerable progress that has been made, it is apparent
that effective gender mainstreaming has not been fully integrated into country
strategies or in the practice of EU development cooperation. In the case of the
European Commission a ‘Thematic Evaluation of the Integration of Gender in
EC Development Co-operation with Third Countries’ (2003) recognized the
constructive work that has been done by the Commission but concluded that
specific policy goals on Gender Equality and the integration of gender in EC
development co-operation have been weak. Furthermore, the Report con-
cluded that the financial resources specifically allocated to support the inte-
gration of gender in development cooperation have been negligible compared
to the resources allocated to other horizontal issues. The indications are that
many of the recommendations of this Evaluation remain valid – both for the
Commission and for some EU Member States. (See the 9 main recommenda-
tions of the Report in Annex IV). (22)
One of the major assets the EU has available to promote Gender Equality in its
external relations is the experience of best practices from inside the Union.
Gender Equality is recognised by the EU as a fundamental human right and as
a necessary condition for the achievement of the EU objectives of growth, full
employment and social cohesion. Accordingly, the EU has invested heavily in
Gender Equalitythrough legislation (23), gender mainstreaming, specificmeas-
ures for the advancement of women, action programmes, social dialogue and
dialogue with civil society. 
A genuine European approach should be built based on this longstanding
experience, as well as on the unique nature of Europe as a multicultural and
highly diverse group of countries that – despite significant differences in cul-
ture and traditions – are all united in devoting a great deal of attention to the
issue ofequalitybetween women and men. Asa fundamentalEuropean object-
ive, the EU should supportthird countriesin adhering to, and in the implemen-
tation of, international commitments such as the Beijing Platform for Action.
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4. An EU Strategy to Accelerate the Achievement
of Gender Equality
The European Union is now at a turning point regarding Gender Equality in
Development Cooperation. The frameworkand policies are in place – the most
importantquestion ishow to ensure the effective implementation ofstrategies
and practices within the new aid modalities that genuinely deliver for women.
Ithasto be clearlyseen thatmeasuresto increase Gender Equality, in addition
to increasing socialcohesion and enhancing the protection ofwomen’shuman
rights, have a strong impact on economic growth, employment and poverty
reduction. 
4.1. Objectives
The new EU strategy must respond to two objectives: first, to increase the
efficiency of gender mainstreaming. Second, to refocus specific actions for
women's empowerment in our partner countries. To reach these objectives
cooperation strategiesfor Gender Equalityand women empowermentwillhave
to adapt to the new aid architecture, primarily budget support.
4.1.1. Efficient mainstreaming
For Gender Equality mainstreaming and women's empowerment to become
more effective, changes will be needed in three areas:
(1) Political action:
• Gender Equality and women empowerment have to be brought to the table
during the politicaldialogue with partner countriesatthe highestlevel(24);
(2) Development cooperation: 
• The key role of women in growth and development needs to be taken into
account in the preparation and implementation of cooperation strategies;
e.g. agricultural and food security strategies must clearly address the dif-
fering constraints faced by rural women, since in certain developing coun-
tries they are responsible for up to 80% of basic food production (25);
• Effective partnership, dialogue and consultation have to be established
with relevant stakeholders (including governments, research centres, uni-
versities, civil society, international organisations) in the preparation of
country strategies and aid programmes; An EU Strategy to Accelerate the Achievement of Gender Equality
• Mutual accountability mechanisms have to be put in place that include
Gender Equality and women empowerment; the accountability role of dif-
ferent actors: government, regional economic communities, development
agencies, international institutions, civil society, parliament and media,
must be clarified;
• Gender sensitive performance indicators have to be developed and used;
• Budget support has to take into account Gender Equality concerns by link-
ing the disbursement of incentive tranches to gender sensitive indicators
and by going hand in hand with a high quality policy dialogue.
(3) Institutional capacity building: 
• Updated practicaltoolshave to be developed in the assessmentand imple-
mentation phases (26);
• Improved access to information and best practices, and gender training for
partner countries and staff have to be provided.
4.1.2. Specific actions to empower women
Deriving from the analysis in Section 2 above, 41 gender specific actions have
been identified in the following broad areas: 
• Governance (human rights, women'spoliticalempowerment, development
of indicators, role of women in conflict and post conflict situations);
• Employmentand economicactivities(economicand socialempowermentof
women, employment, gender budgetanalysis, publicfinance management);
• Education  (abolishing school fees, incentives to send girls to school,
improving school environment, adult literacy);
• Health (social protection schemes, sexual and reproductive health and
rights);
• Gender-based violence (legislation, victim protection, awareness raising
through media, education and training).
An indicative list of these possible supportive actions has been drawn up and
is presented in Annex III. These activities are examples to help to identify the
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proper programme mix for each specific country or region. The proper mix of
activities will be decided case by case after a thorough analysis of each indi-
vidual situation.
4.2. The Principle of Ownership and the New Aid Modalities
Central to the Paris Declaration is the principle of ‘ownership’ of development
co-operation initiatives by the recipient country. For actions that promote
Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment it has been shown that ‘owner-
ship’ must not only be taken by partner governments, but also by the women
beneficiaries themselves. In practice this often means ownership through the
involvement of CSOs and CBOs (27). Support to CSOs advocating Gender
Equality is especially important in cases where the number of women active in
local or central government or in parliament is limited. The EU will, therefore,
seek to support the emergence of such CSOs where they do not exist and to
ensure a significant investment in capacity-building for such organisations
where they exist but are in need of strengthening for example in the areas of:
lobbying skills, advocacy, gender analysis and economic literacy. 
The EU will seekto ensure the efficient channelling of development aid in sup-
port of country-owned gender policies on the basis of an in-depth policy dia-
logue with partner governments and key non-government stakeholders. The
constraintsand needsin each specificcountrycontextwillbe analyzed in order
to enable genuine local ownership to be created both at the government and
at the civil society levels as well as within the donor community. 
The paradigm shift represented by the Paris Declaration is reflected in the pre-
ferred new mechanisms for aid delivery, i.e. budget support and sector wide
approaches, as opposed to support for individual, stand-alone projects. The
use of budget support is dependent on the presence of certain conditions, in
particular having a nationalor sectoraldevelopmentstrategyunder implemen-
tation, having a macro-economic reform programme in place supported by
major international donors (usually the IMF) and having a proven commitment
to reform. 
Budget support can contribute to the achievement of Gender Equality by link-
ing the disbursementofvariable tranchesto improvementsin gender disaggre-
gated indicators; by strengthening public finance management systems, and
by stimulating a wider dialogue on partner countries’ policy priorities.An EU Strategy to Accelerate the Achievement of Gender Equality
The European Commission and the Member States will support the develop-
ment of indicators plus the collection of the relevant data that can track
changes in Gender Equality and which can be linked to the disbursement of
variable tranches.
4.3. Gender in National Strategies
The preparation ofa PovertyReduction StrategyPaper, a NationalDevelopment
Plan or a Country Strategy Paper provides a unique opportunity to analyse the
status of women relative to men, to determine gender-related obstacles to
developmentand growth and to define country-wide gender sensitive policies.
The gender situation ofa countryhasto be analysed acrosssectorswith an eye
to understanding its implications for growth and poverty. In this context, the
EU’s on-going process of political dialogue with partner countries will be used
to ensure that Gender Equality issues are included in the analysis of poverty
variables. This political dialogue will be complemented by EU assistance to
reinforce the gender capacitiesofnationalauthorities. Emphasiswillbe puton
defining poverty not simply as a lack of income or financial resources, but as
encompassing the notion of inequalities in access to, and control over, the
material and non-material benefits in society. This will involve the inclusion of
a number of issues on the political agenda such as:
• Securing acceptance for a broader multi-dimensionalconception ofpoverty
beyond income poverty including time poverty and measures of the differ-
entialimpactofpovertyon both women and men, aswellasthe promotion
of technology that reduces time poverty;
• Securing agreement that civil society should contribute to policy dialogue,
formulation and monitoring of PRSPs all from a gender perspective plus
agreement for appropriate capacity-building measures to be put in place; 
4.4. A Need for Gender Sensitive Indicators
Indicators are necessary to measure the outcomes of gender mainstreaming
and gender specific actions (28). Most indicators currently used tend to reflect
Gender Equality concerns in the social sectors. There are few reliable indica-
tors available in most developing countries to measure changes in female
employment, the unpaid care economy, civil rights, incidence/prevalence of
violence against women, right to inheritance/property and land use, women’s
representation and participation in decision-making.
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The EU will therefore support the development and use of gender-sensitive
indicators and the strengthening of the underlying basic statistics to enable
progressacrossthe entire spectrum ofequalityand empowermentissuesto be
addressed (29). AnnexVIIcontainsa non-exhaustive listofpossible indicators,
taking into account the areas of education, health, governance/empowerment
of women, employment/economic activities, time use and violence against
women. 
4.5. Strategies for Gender Responsive Budgets
The increased use of budget support as a major instrument of aid delivery
raises the question of how to promote Gender Equality within or through such
a programme. To achieve thisitisvitallyimportantto ensure thatpartner coun-
tries’ budgets are gender responsive. This requires:
• Focus on gender awareness and gender mainstreaming in the budgeting
process at national and local levels;
• Re-prioritisation of expenditure and re-orientation of programmes within
sectors to achieve both Gender Equality and human development;
• Monitoring of government revenue and expenditure to ensure that the
inequality gap between females and males is in fact decreasing.
4.6. Coordination and Harmonisation with Member States
Coordination aimed at maximising complementarity between the programmes
ofEU Member Statesand the Commission isa keyelementin the effective pro-
motion of Gender Equality in development cooperation. The Commission will
continue the practice of organising regular meetings of Member State Gender
Experts and, together with the Member States, will seek to increase not only
EU-wide coordination but also harmonisation of activities on the promotion of
Gender Equality in development cooperation. Priority will be given to reinforc-
ing EC and Member State gender expertise through the identification and
exchange of best practices. The preparation of Country Strategy Papers and
Joint Assistance Strategies will continue to be a focus for enhanced coordina-
tion and harmonisation efforts. Furthermore, EC Delegations and EU Member
State Embassies will continue to use existing coordination mechanisms to
address Gender Equality activities in the field.Specific EC Actions for the Promotion of Gender Equality
4.7. EU Action at International and Regional Levels
Bilateralcooperation with partner countrieson the issue ofGender Equalitywill
be complemented byEU action atthe internationallevel. The presence ofa uni-
fied European voice at this level reinforces the role of the EU as a major global
actor in developmentcooperation. The Commission and the EU Member States
will actively seek to advance Gender Equality and women’s empowerment in
relevant international fora. Of particular importance is the promotion of the
extension of the scope of Gender Equality from health and education to other
areas not captured by MDG3.
Regional and inter-regional cooperation encourage information sharing
between the members of the regional organisations on gender specific tools,
data, analyticaldocumentation and training. The Commission and the Member
States will therefore continue to promote regional cooperation in the field of
Gender Equalityaswellasengaging with the existing internationaland regional
networks in this area.
5. Specific EC Actions for the Promotion of Gender Equality
The role ofthe European Commission in implementing thisstrategywillinvolve
actions on three fronts: 
5.1. Country Programming
The European Commission will pay particular attention to ensure that Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment feature in all future country and regional
strategies (30). This will involve the following actions:
• the further development of internal tools and programming guidelines;
• the systematic gender assessment of country and regional strategies,
including the mid-term and final reviews of such strategies;
• the adjustment of country strategies according to the results of the above
assessments;
• the building of partnerships with relevant international organisations who
have a significant experience in mainstreaming gender into projects and
programmes. (31)
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5.2. Thematic Programmes and Other Financial Instruments
Apartfrom nationalor regionalprogrammes, additionalresourcesare available
through multi-annual thematic programmes tabled by the Commission under
the financial perspectives 2007-2013. The Thematic Programme “Investing in
People” (32) contains a financial envelope for funding EC actions in the area
of promoting Gender Equality and the empowerment of women. Through this
Thematic Programme EC funding will be made available to the following broad
areas of interventions:
• policyand advocacyeventspromoting the implementation ofinternational
commitments;
• capacitybuilding for NGOsand associationsdedicated to the advancement
of Gender Equality and women’s rights;
• strengthening statistical capacity of governments.
The funds available will be allocated through calls for proposals from eligible
organisations and by direct agreements with selected partners.
Gender Equality will also be supported through the implementation of the
Environment (33) and Food Security (34) thematic programmes, as well as
under the new European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR II) (35) and the Instrument for Stability (36).
5.3. Monitoring and Follow-up
The practical outcome of this new EU Strategy needs to be monitored.
Accordingly, to evaluate the progress made and to refine and adapt the
Strategyto changesin the internationalcontext, the European Commission will
organise in 2010 a second major international Conference on Gender Equality
with the participation of all major stakeholders (37). Furthermore, a mid-term
and a final evaluation of the implementation of this strategy will be executed
by an external evaluator in 2010 and at the end of the 10
th EDF cycle. These
evaluations will include a gender budget analysis of EC funded projects and
programmes including general budget support in at least twelve selected pilot
countries.Conclusion
EC Delegations, in close collaboration with Member State Embassies, will con-
tinue to include in their annual reporting an assessment of the promotion and
achievement of Gender Equality in the partner country. Also, the Gender
Equality section of the ‘Annual Report on the European Community’s develop-
ment policy and the implementation of external assistance’ will continue to
publish aggregate information on progress made towards achieving Gender
Equality. The EC and the Member States will examine the possibility of a joint
EU annual reporting system that could include monitoring of gender main-
streaming in EU development cooperation.
6. Conclusion
The eradication of poverty demands that women and men be given equal
opportunities in the economic and social spheres and have equal access to,
and control over, the resources of society. However, if significant progress is to
be made in the achievement of greater Gender Equality by the EU’s developing
country partners, the EU needs to tackle systematically the constraints on the
achievement of this goal that exist both on the side of developing countries
themselves and inherent in some of the EU’s own development cooperation
mechanisms. These issues can be addressed only in the context of an
enhanced political dialogue which incorporates Gender as an explicit theme
and which paves the way for the EU to engage actively with those CSO’s and
other organisations that make up the constituency for increased Gender
Equality in the country concerned.
Within such a framework the primary instrument to achieve greater Gender
Equality, gender mainstreaming has to be used in a more effective and prac-
tical way if we are to make real progress towards the goal of greater Gender
Equality. The secondary instrument, specific, targeted actions, to empower
women, has to be used so as to complement mainstreaming activities and to
address key strategic issues that impact on the well-being and opportunities
ofparticular vulnerable groups. For both instruments, their application mustbe
sensitive to, and reflect, the unique social and cultural situation of each of the
EU’s developing partner countries. To support such an approach, the focus of
Gender Equality which, hitherto, has been mainly on health and education,
must be broadened and extended to include other areas of cooperation. 
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A combination of advocacy, support for women’s groups and specific actions
to change cultural, socialand politicalpatternsand the distribution ofpolitical
and economic power marks the way forward to promote Gender Equality.
Clearly this will be a challenging task. But the EU is committed to supporting
our partner countries to overcome all obstacles on this crucial path.| 57
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With the adoption of the European Consensus on Development in December
2005, the European Union (EU) placed development at the heart of its exter-
nal action and gave it an unprecedented political dimension. For the first time
ever a shared vision, binding the Council, the Parliament, the Commission and
each of the 27 Member States, gives the EU’s action the reference framework
required to deal more effectively with poverty and growing inequalities in the
world, and to be more coherent in tackling such global challenges as climate
change, energy, migration, security and the social dimension of globalisation.
Thisisan importantdimension ofthe Sustainable DevelopmentStrategywhich
is now included in the EU's general objectives.
While recognising the number and variety of instruments for promoting devel-
opment, the EU has decided to increase aid substantially, believing it more
necessary than ever to speed up progress towards the Millennium
Development Goals. 
Since the MonterreyConference on DevelopmentFinancing in 2002, the EU has
made a commitmentto increase itsdevelopmentaid. Itisin particular commit-
ted to collectivelydedicate 0.39% ofitsgrossnationalincome to development
aid in 2006 and 0.56% in 2010 in order to reach 0.7% in 2015. Byactivelycon-
tributing to the adoption of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, the EU
has also committed itself to a radical overhaul of its aid system. 
The EU recognises that partner countries have the primary responsibility for
their own development and commits the EU to providing adapted assistance
thatrespondsto their specificneeds. Butbyinvesting in socialsectors, in infra-
structures, in institutional reforms and supporting efforts towards good govern-
ance, the EU assumes its share of the work.
An unprecedented political framework has been mapped out between devel-
oping countries and the EU, bringing together aid and policy dialogue. Europe
has a duty to make a difference. Its influence must be commensurate with the
resources it provides.
The Council has mandated the Commission to follow up these commitments.
The latest studies have prompted it to make three proposals to ensure that the
commitments are honoured in full. 
| 59 Introduction60 | From Monterrey to the European Consensus on Development: honouring our commitments
1. The European Union honoured its overall commitments
to increase aid in 2006 – but meeting the next target
dates will call for further, concerted efforts
In 2002, the EU committed itself to collectively dedicate 0.39% of its gross
national income to development aid in 2006. The EU hasn't only reached this
objective, it has gone beyond. The EU collectively devoted 0.42% of its gross
national income to development aid in 2006. 
The following comparative figures help gauge the scale of the effort:
• In 2006 EU development aid amounted to €48 billion, an appreciable
increase from €35 billion in 2004 and €45 billion in 2005.
• The aid of one Member States has exceeded 1% of its gross national
income.
• The ten Member States which acceded to the EU in 2004 and were previ-
ously providing very little aid have since doubled the volume of their aid,
thereby demonstrating their commitment to the Community acquis and
their will to achieve their individual targets.
• This aid effort represents more or less €100 per EU citizen a year; it also
represents €40 for every person living on less than a dollar a day in the
developing countries.
By way of comparison, US aid stands at 0.17% of gross national income and
the equivalent of €53 per US citizen; the figures for Japan are 0.25% and
€69 respectively.
This collective effort masks marked disparities between Member States. While
some devote more than 0.80% of national income to development, far more
than the most ambitious targets, others continue to fall far short of the aver-
age or their own objectives or register a decline of their aid in 2006 compared
with 2005. It is also clear that a substantial share of the additional aid takes
the form of debt alleviation. In the years to come, the challenge will be to con-
tinue to increase development aid as a whole while reducing the share of debt
alleviation.| 61
Aid for Trade must increase so that developing countries can take advantage 
of trade liberalisation – an implementation plan will be needed
Asregardsthe breakdown ofEU aid, the prioritygiven to Africa isbeing upheld,
since at least half of the EU’s aid is already going to this continent, which
should receive an additional €10 billion a year from 2010.
Overall, the EU is well on the way to honouring its commitments by 2010, but
whether these trends and results are borne out will depend on the capacity to
mobilise political and public support. The increase recorded in some Member
States’ aid has partly been the result of debt forgiveness or other one off oper-
ations, especiallyhumanitarian aid. Sustaining growth aid budgetswillrequire
the mobilisation of new flows of programmable aid in future. 
This encouraging but uneven situation, plus the need for close monitoring of
trends in EU aid budgets lead the Commission to recommend that each
Member State draw up a road map by the end of 2007 to ensure a gradual
increase in officialaid flowsby2010 and 2015 in order to preventanyslippage
on collective and individual commitments. 
2. Aid for Trade must increase so that developing countries
can take advantage of trade liberalisation – 
an implementation plan will be needed
The poorestcountries’ share ofinternationaltrade remainsmarginalin spite of
the tariff preferences they enjoy, especially on the European market. Beyond
technical assistance to the implementation of trade policies (including for
instance custom policies), a consensushasdeveloped in recentyearsasto the
need to go further and incorporate into cooperation strategies support for the
development of productive capacity, support for trade related infrastructure
and support to overcoming other supply constraints.
In December 2005 the EU pledged to collectively increase its aid for trade to
€2 billion a year from 2010 for all developing countries, €1 billion of it in
Community aid and €1 billion in bilateral aid from the Member States.62 | From Monterrey to the European Consensus on Development: honouring our commitments
The Commission and the Member States must agree a joint strategy on aid
for trade, as requested by the Council in October 2006. According to the
Commission, this strategy should contain the following essential elements:
• the announced increase in EU aid for trade to €2 billion from 2010. The
Commission is on the right track to respect its own commitment. Member
Statesshould reach a levelof€600 million by2008 to respecttheirs. Ifthis
wouldn't be the case, specific corrective measures should be envisaged;
• the attribution of a significant share of these resources to ACP countries in
the contextofthe EconomicPartnership Agreements(EPA). The strategywill
have to specify the amount envisaged for ACP countries;
• a process to identify the partner countries’ needs on the basis of their own
assessments and existing international mechanisms. The involvement of
civil society and the private sector in this process is crucial and must be
facilitated. Furthermore, the sustainabilityofmeasuresand reformsbacked
by the EU must be guaranteed;
• more effective aid through the implementation of the announced reforms,
in particular progress towards joint programming, the division of labour,
alignment and more effective aid arrangements, such as budget aid and
cofinancing;
• the constitution by the ACP regions of regional funds to cover needs iden-
tified in the contextofthe EPAsand to supportregionalintegration bychan-
nelling EU aid in a coherent manner. Created in 2006, the Infrastructure
Partnership for Africa isthe firstsuch initiative. A number ofMember States
are already contributing, and the others are invited to join this concerted
effort.The quality and effectiveness of EU aid must improve – 
the Commission has proposed a code of conduct on division of labour
3. The quality and effectiveness of EU aid must improve – 
the Commission has proposed a code of conduct
on division of labour (
1)
The expansion and multiplication of development cooperation activities in
recent years has resulted in a system which is complex and costly to manage
for partner countries.
The harmonisation effort actively promoted by the Commission lies at the
heart of the Paris Agenda on aid effectiveness, which the EU wholeheartedly
endorsed. 
There are three fundamental aspects:
• the division of labour. The Commission has proposed a voluntary and flex-
ible EU code ofconductto promote complementaritybetween donorsin the
interests of greater effectiveness;
• ownership and the alignment of cooperation programmes on the partner
countries’ strategies and procedures. Though enshrined in the Paris
Declaration and the European Consensus, these principlesare stillfar from
being realised. Not only are countries’ budget cycles not respected but a
welter ofconditionalitiesundermine the continuityand predictabilityofaid.
The Commission believesitisnow time to applythe conceptofa “contract”
based on tangible results in relation to the Millennium Development Goals
rather than the annual checking of each individual donor’s traditional con-
ditionalities;
• aid modalities. Programme aid and budget aid must quickly become the
preferred delivery methods, without excluding other aid modalities when
they are more appropriate. The dispersion of aid across many small
projects– asin Tanzania, where there are 600 projectsoflessthan €1 mil-
lion in the health sector alone – generates unnecessary costs and lessens
effectiveness. 
These reforms must take place against a backdrop of more decisive progress
towards joint programming of bilateral and Community aid. 
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4. Conclusion
The EU has taken, at the very highest political level, ambitious development
commitments by deciding to raise its aid gradually to a level of 0.7% of gross
national income by 2015 (€164 per European citizen a year) and taking the
requisite steps to increase the overall effectiveness of EU aid as a whole. 
We need to move from words to deeds. This calls for the honouring of commit-
ments and political will. There is no question of changing the institutional bal-
ance in the EU or increasing the Commission’s powers in the sphere of
development. It is simply a matter of a stronger, more efficient EU that holds
out better prospect for the weakest and most vulnerable people on the planet.
To offer this prospect the EU has to act collectively.| 65
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Trade is an important catalyst for growth and poverty reduction in developing
countries. But successful integration of developing countries into world trade
requires more than better market access and strengthened international trade
rules. In order to fullyexploitthe benefitsfrom trade, developing countriesalso
need to remove supply side constraints and address structural weaknesses.
This includes domestic reforms in trade-related policies, trade facilitation,
enhancementofcustomscapacities, upgrading ofinfrastructure, enhancement
of productive capacities and building of domestic and regional markets.
Complementary efforts are required in areas such as macroeconomic stability,
fiscalreforms, promotion ofinvestment, labour policy, capitaland productmar-
ket regulations and institutions, and human capital development.
This is what Aid for Trade is for. Aid for Trade should have a global scope and
support all developing countries, in particular the least developed, in their
efforts to reform and to adjust to the world trading system, in the wider con-
text of sustainable development. Aid for Trade is geared to generating growth,
employment and income. It is therefore a contribution to the first of the
Millennium Development Goals namely to reduce the proportion of people liv-
ing on less than a dollar a day (MDG 1). It also supports MDG 8, which is to
establish a globalpartnership for development, in particular to develop further
an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-
discriminatory. Aid for Trade isa keycomplementto trade negotiations. Itisnot
a substitute for a pro-development outcome of these negotiations but should
be delivered independently of progress in the negotiations.
The concepts behind Aid for Trade are well known to the EU. The EU is collect-
ively the biggest donor in the field of Trade Related Assistance (TRA). The
European Consensusfor Developmentidentifiestrade and regionalintegration
as an important area for Community action. One case in point are the ongoing
negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the African
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. TRA commitments are also significant
for other EU partner countries such as those in Asia or in Latin America.
This Communication is the Commission's contribution to further expanding EU
support for Aid for Trade, with a view to adoption of a joint EU strategy by the
Councilin the second halfof2007, asagreed bythe Councilin October 2006(
1).
(1) See background in Annex.
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Anchored in well-established policy commitments, and building on the recom-
mendations of a WTO Task Force(
2), the value added of an EU Aid for Trade
strategy lies in agreeing on the specific action to deliver. Such EU cooperation
willreinforce the impactofEU Aid for Trade and contribute to the globaldebate
on this topic. 
2. Objectives
Aid for Trade has multiple objectives: to enable developing countries, particu-
larly the least developed countries (LDCs), to use trade more effectively to pro-
mote growth, employment, developmentand povertyreduction and to achieve
their development objectives; to help them build and modernise supply-side
capacity and trade-related infrastructure in order to facilitate their access to
marketsand to exportmore; to help them implementand adjustto trade reform
and liberalisation, including via labour market and social adjustments; to
assist regional integration; to assist smooth integration into the world trading
system and to assist with implementing trade agreements, all in the context of
sustainable development, preservation of natural resources and the environ-
ment, and promotion of decent work.
Following the Council’s guidelines, an EU Aid for Trade strategy can contribute
to these objectives by addressing the following issues(
3):
1. Increasing the volumes of EU Aid for Trade, in particular by taking Trade
Related Assistance up to €2 billion a year by 2010; but also by promoting
an effective response to wider Aid for Trade needs(
4).
2. Enhancing the qualityofEU Aid for Trade, in particular by applying commit-
ments to making development cooperation more effective.
3. Supporting effective monitoring and reporting. 
4. Ensuring that Commission and Member States have sufficient capacity to
implement the above mentioned objectives.
(2) See  details in  Annex.
(3)  The strategy will have a much wider coverage than the recently created EC budget line on Aid 
for Trade.
(4) See definitions in Annex.| 69 Increasing the volume of EU aid for Trade
As the Council drew specific attention to the Aid for Trade needs related to the
ongoing negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ACP
countries, the EU strategy should pay similar specific attention to these devel-
opments, in order to help realise the full development potential of EPAs. Aid
for Trade is also an important element of EC assistance in Asia and in Latin
America.
3. Increasing the volume of EU aid for Trade
3.1. A Roadmap for meeting the EU's financial commitments
on trade related assistance
TRA comprises two categories: "trade policy and regulation"; and "trade devel-
opment". The first refers to support for the effective participation of develop-
ing countries in multilateral trade negotiations, analysis and implementation
of multilateral trade agreements, trade-related legislation and regulatory
reforms (including Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary
measures), tariffstructures, supportto regionaltrade arrangements, trade facili-
tation, including customsregimesand equipment, and issuessuch assecurity
of the supply chain(
5). The second category covers business development and
activities aimed at improving the business climate, business support services
and institutions, access to trade finance, trade promotion and market devel-
opment in the productive and services sectors, including at the institutional
and enterprise level.
During the baseline period 2001-2004, the TRA commitments of Community
and Member Stateswere, on average €840 million(
6) and €300 million per year
respectively. The Council requested a roadmap for delivering in 2010 on the
Community'sand Member States' commitmentto take thisvolume to €1+1 bil-
lion a year. After analysing the available figures, the Commission concludes
that it is on track to meet its commitment. Due to lack of forecasting data, the
Commission ishowever notin a position to assesswhether Member Statesare
collectively on track to attain their 2010 target(
7).
(5)  In line with the World Customs Organisation Framework of Standards.
(6)  Includes funds both from the European Development Fund and the EC general budget.
(7)  See details on Member States in the Commission Staff Working paper accompanying the
Monterrey report - SEC(2007) 415 - and details on EC commitments in Annex.70 | Towards an EU Aid for Trade strategy – the Commission's contribution
The Council decided that a substantial share of the increased EU TRA should
go to ACP countries, in support of regional integration and EPAs. Guidance on
the actualamountsinvolved isimportantfor ACP partnersatthispointin time.
On the basis of current plans the share of Community TRA which will go to ACP
is expected to remain relatively stable. Whilst this reflects an increase in
absolute terms, it means that the bulk of additional TRA resources for the ACP
will have to come from the Member States.
EU Member Statesand the Community(aswellasother donors) provide aid on
the basisofprioritiesexpressed bypartner countriesin their nationaldevelop-
mentstrategies. To deliver on their commitmentsthe EU dependslargelyon the
extentto which trade-related needsare articulated in these nationalstrategies.
Assisting developing countries with identifying and prioritising trade related
assistance needsistherefore an integralpartofmeeting the EU'sfinancialcom-
mitments. One key instrument for doing so is the Integrated Framework (IF) to
which both the Commission and several MS are already contributing(
8). Key
challenges are to enhance the IF agenda and impact and expand the approach
to other developing countries. At regional level, effective approaches to trade
needs assessments must be developed.
Commission recommendations
• A linear trend from the presentsituation to their 1 billion targetwould imply
that the collective commitments to TRA by EU Member States should rise
to at least €600 million by 2008. The strategy should, however, consider
which measures to take should TRA from the Member States fail to reach
this level by 2008. 
• The strategy should provide guidance on the amounts involved in the
Councilcommitmentto allocate a “substantialshare” ofthe additionalTRA
to ACP countries, in support of regional integration and EPAs with a view to
increasing the share of overall TRA allocated to the ACP.
• The EU strategy should underline the importance of integrating trade-
related concerns into national development strategies and identify criteria
(8)  The IFisa multi-donor program whose objectivesare to supportLDCsmainstream trade into their
national development plans; and to assist in the co-ordinated delivery of TRA in response to
needs identified by the LDC. In August 2006, 42 LDCs were participating in the programme.Towards an EU Aid for Trade strategy – the Commission's contribution
for when it is acceptable to finance trade-related priorities in anticipation
of national development strategies being updated. The strategy should
demonstrate the EU's commitment to engage actively in the enhanced IF,
in particular by active in-country participation; and to extend the IF methods
to non-LDCs, including via a plan for joint EU engagement in the creation
of an IDA-only(
9) mechanism.
• The strategy should outline how to support regional trade needs assess-
ments in support of regional integration.
3.2. EU support to the wider Aid for Trade agenda
The Commission fullysupportsthe wider Aid for Trade agenda identified bythe
WTO Task Force, i.e. inclusion of trade-related infrastructure, productive cap-
acities and trade-related adjustment. This broad approach is reflected for
example in the 2004 EU Commodity Action Plan. Although the EU Council did
not set specific numerical targets on the new Aid for Trade categories, the EU
is already providing substantial support to such areas. For instance, support for
trade related infrastructure averaged €1.480 billion a year from the Member
Statesand €1.290 billion a year from the Communityduring the period 2001-2004. 
There is some lack of clarity in the new Aid for Trade categories, and some
overlaps with the already existing categories ofTRA(
10). This has to be tackled
if monitoring and reporting are to be developed usefully for Aid for Trade. This
is recognised by the Aid for Trade community, including within the EU, and
work is in progress, in particular within the OECD/DAC, to clarify and simplify
the scope and use proxiesfrom longstanding ODA categories. The EU, asa key
partner in the Aid for Trade initiative, should participate in the unfolding
discussions.
In thisregard, the Commission considersthateconomicinfrastructure isa help-
ful proxy for trade related infrastructure. For productive capacities, existing
reporting categories can be used. In the context of trade-related adjustment,
the Commission considers that this should include support to fiscal reforms
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(9) The  IDA-only countries are:  Mongolia,  Tonga, Vietnam, Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Cameroon, Republic of
the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Kenya.
(10) See discussion in Annex.72 | Towards an EU Aid for Trade strategy – the Commission's contribution
aiming atintroducing more sustainable formsoftaxsystems(
11). Linked to this,
budgetsupportcan be an appropriate meansto tackle fallsin customsrevenue
following trade liberalisation, or to support trade-related social safety nets to
facilitate adjustment to trade opening and globalisation.
Commission recommendations 
• In addition to TRA, the EU strategy should include a political commitment
to strengthen EU support for trade-related infrastructure, productive cap-
acity and trade-related adjustment, starting by supporting good coverage
of such issues in trade needs assessments. This is particularly relevant for
small, vulnerable and land-locked economies, many of which are ACP.
• The EU strategy should state the intent to develop coherent EU reporting
practices for all categories of Aid for Trade and to continue to participate
actively and jointly in relevant discussions at international level. The strat-
egy should make it clear that the intent of the EU financial commitment to
TRA is solid and will be maintained regardless of the evolving international
debate.
4. Enhancing the quality of EU Aid for Trade
Increasing levels of Aid for Trade raise the questions of quality and effective-
ness. Withoutdue attention to these matters, additionalfinancialresourceswill
not bring about the improvements desired by partner countries.
The EU strategy will not be starting from scratch. Based on the conclusions of
the EU Ad HocWorking Partyon Harmonisation, the EU made a substantialcon-
tribution to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. It is already fully com-
mitted to the Paris principles and has gone further to act on several of these.
In particular, in April 2006, the Council agreed on principles and a format for
joint programming and issued a mandate for further work on complementarity
and co- financing(
12).
(11) In line with the principles of good governance in the tax area.
(12) See Annex for details.Enhancing the quality of EU aid for Trade
The EU Aid for Trade strategy should offer a practical application of the agreed
principles, focusing on five quality aspects: poverty and Aid for Trade; owner-
ship and participation; sustainability; joint analysis, programming and deliv-
ery; and effectiveness of regional Aid for Trade.
4.1. Poverty and Aid for Trade 
Within each category of Aid for Trade, choices made will have an impact on
poverty levels. Sometimes, there are trade-offs between indirect and direct
povertyreduction effects. The Commission hasnoted thatthe povertylinkages
are not always well articulated in trade development strategies and Aid for
Trade operations, in particular for traditional TRA. 
Deeper reflection on how to ensure poverty reduction through Aid for Trade is
necessary, for each category of Aid for Trade. More could be done to identify
the areas of Aid for Trade which bring about the widest and most sustainable
reduction in poverty. In individual operations, the EU should support analysis
of implications on poverty and incorporate conclusions in a transparent way.
Efforts should specifically include the gender dimension.
The decentworkagenda(
13) isofrelevance here, to addresstrade related issues
of labour market and social adjustment. Similarly, the strategy should confirm
support for the world-wide implementation of ILO’s core labour standards.
Voluntary initiatives giving consumers assurances relevant to sustainable
development, such as Fair Trade, eco-labels, and comparable corporate
schemes, are also important instruments with potential for reducing poverty
and promoting socio-economic development, which a joint EU strategy should
address.
Commission recommendation
• The strategy should stress the importance that the EU attaches to the
impacts of Aid for Trade on poverty, and lay down steps to ensure that the
activities undertaken under the strategy deliver in this regard.
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4.2. Ownership and participation 
Ownership and participation are two aid effectiveness principles of special
importance to Aid for Trade. Better ownership, manifested by integration of
trade-related issuesinto povertyreduction and equivalentstrategies, isneces-
sary for increasing Aid for Trade. Identifying pertinent trade priorities, building
consensus for reform policies and developing effective remedies to address
bottlenecks to trade require active participation by the private sector, social
partnersand civilsociety. Often, partner governmentsneed assistance to man-
age such consultation processes. Effective participation of a wide range of
stakeholders can inter alia be facilitated by strengthening intermediate organ-
isations such as chambers of commerce.
Commission recommendation
• The EU strategy should emphasise the key role that the private sector and
civil society can play in Aid for Trade. It should outline ways of supporting
the capacity of governments to manage consultation processes, and of
weaker interest groups to engage in these processes.
4.3. Sustainability
Sustainabilityisthe underpinning principle ofthe EU Aid for Trade strategyand
should be dealt with in all its dimensions – institutional, financial/economic,
social and environmental. 
The key to institutional and financial sustainability of programmes lies in
ensuring stakeholder capacity-building and ownership in all operations, as
discussed elsewhere in this Communication.
To fully integrate both social and environmental considerations into Aid for
Trade programmes, existing impact assessment regulations and procedures,
both ofpartnersand donors, need to be applied. Sustainabilityimpactassess-
ments of trade policies and agreements should be further developed and the
results better used both by the EU and partners. 
Asregardsenvironmentalissuesspecifically, EU Aid for Trade should help part-
ners develop more sustainable production methods and assist producers in| 75 Enhancing the quality of EU Aid for Trade
complying with (public and private) health, safety and environment standards
in export markets and improve the capacity of customs to help implement
trade-related aspects of Multilateral Environmental Agreements.
Other importantrelated issuesare the promotion ofdecentworkand the devel-
opment of effective labour market and social adjustment mechanisms. For
example, the EU willcontinue to assistproducersin complying with recognised
labour standards, practices and regulations and in promoting occupational
health and safety.
Commission recommendation
• The EU strategy should promote the sustainability of Aid for Trade, includ-
ing by foreseeing support to stakeholder ownership, capacity building and
participation; pursuing social and environmental goals; applying EU and
partner countries' tools and procedures for environment, social, gender
and sustainability impact assessments; integrating results from such work
into in-country trade needs assessments; promoting sustainable produc-
tion methods; and helping comply with relevant product standards in
exports markets.
4.4. Joint analysis, programming and delivery
Recent trends in EU development aid all point in the same direction: greater
complementarity and cooperation is needed between EU partners, across all
stages of the programme cycle and for all types of instruments. This must also
apply to Aid for Trade(See Annex).
Asregardsjointanalysisoftrade related needs, IFprocessesshould be the pre-
ferred framework for EU coordination in LDCs. Similar processes should be
developed for joint analysis in other countries. In ACP regions, Regional
Preparatory Task Forces are important complements, in the context of EPAs. 
As a further step, there is scope for the EU to coordinate better its response
strategies in countries and regions. The Joint Trade and Development Expert
Group could develop into an informal coordination forum for multilateral
initiatives.76 | Towards an EU Aid for Trade strategy – the Commission's contribution
Opportunities for joint delivery will depend largely on progress in working
through sector wide approaches (SWAPs), as these are one of the precondi-
tions for embarking on sector budget support. Good trade needs assessment
processes and in-country coordination will help prepare the ground for suc-
cessful SWAPs. 
The possibilities for use of general budget support in Aid for Trade should be
examined, including the issue ofdeveloping appropriate indicators. Finally, EU
co-financing of Aid for Trade could allow increasing Aid for Trade without
stretching partners' absorption capacity, by opening up existing EC pro-
grammes to Member States or by allowing some Member States to take the
lead based on their comparative advantage and expertise.
Commission recommendations
• The strategy should lay down actions to facilitate the EU leading the way
on coordinated response strategies in Aid for Trade. This could include
preparing an overview of partner countries with a strong EU Aid for Trade
presence, and assigning EU Aid for Trade contact points to facilitate in-
country EU coordination and joint identification.
• Looking ahead to future opportunitiesto engage in JointProgramming (such
as those related to the mid term review of the Commission's country strate-
gies, including for the 10
th EDF), the strategy should prepare the ground for
good coverage of trade-related issues in the countries concerned. 
• The strategy should lay down actions to further develop use of SWAPs in
Aid for Trade. It should propose measures to build the confidence which is
needed to facilitate application of joint delivery methods such as budget
support and co-financing.
• The strategyshould highlightthe role thatthe JointTrade and Development
Expert Group could play in coordination for multilateral initiatives.| 77 Enhancing the quality of EU Aid for Trade
4.5. Aid effectiveness in regional Aid for Trade
Support for regional integration is a distinctive feature of EU development
cooperation and relations with non-EU countries, in particular through trade
and customspolicy. The regionallevelistherefore importantfor the deliveryof
Aid for Trade, in particular for regions deeply engaged in regional integration
efforts. This corresponds to the growing number of regional trade and cooper-
ation agreements, the growing interest on the part of developing country part-
ners in regional integration and the priority given to regional integration in the
European Consensus for Development, the Cotonou Agreement and the EC
Development Cooperation Instrument.
Programming and delivery at regional level are not different in nature from
thatatnationallevel.The same aid effectivenessprinciplesshould be applied,
although this could be more challenging at regional level. Key actions for aid
effectiveness at regional level include:
• supporting regional partners’ capacity to own and lead Aid for Trade
efforts, in particular by building regional organisations' capacity to assess
the implications of trade or regional integration and/or trade agreements
with third countriesand strengthening their capacityto monitor and imple-
ment commitments, including for issues such as fiscal reforms; 
• coordinating programming in support of regional and trade integration.
Joint EU efforts could be developed to assess needs and identify areas
where the EU could support the integration agenda of the region con-
cerned, including on issues of economic and social integration. Much can
be done at regional level by building on existing efforts on private sector
development, productive capacity and infrastructure;
• pursuing more streamlined methods of delivery. The strategy should
define enhanced coordination modalities with a view to stepping up col-
lective mobilisation ofAfT finance. Regionalmethodsofdeliveryequivalent
to budgetsupportand co-financing should be developed. For example, the
Commission is developing contribution agreements to facilitate financial
management of its regional cooperation. Some ACP regions have begun to
create regional funding mechanisms to facilitate management of regional
programmes, including contributions from the Commission and, possibly,
other donors in support of EPAs; 78 | Towards an EU Aid for Trade strategy – the Commission's contribution
• enhancing cooperation with other donors. The Commission and the
Member States should jointly encourage non EU donors to consider
increasingtheir supportto regionaltrade integration. Regionaldevelopment
banks and international financial institutions are particularly important.
Commission recommendations
• The EU strategy should underline the EU's commitment to applying aid
effectiveness principles at regional level by supporting regional partners’
capacity to own and lead Aid for Trade, coordinating programming, pur-
suing more streamlined delivery modes and enhancing cooperation with
other donors.
• Having regard to the ongoing EPA negotiations, the EU strategyshould indi-
cate a priority for regional interventions in the EPA context, particularly as
regardscoordinating programming and supporting regionallyowned initia-
tives, such as regional EPA funds.
5. Specific ACP angles of the proposals
The October Council paid specific attention to the EPA-related Aid for Trade
agenda in ACP countries. The measuresoutlined above are allessentialfor sup-
porting ACP regionsand countriesin the contextofthe EPAs. Some recommen-
dations are particularly important; they are repeated below:
Commission recommendations
• The EU strategy should provide guidance on the amounts involved in the
Council's commitment to allocate a “substantial share” of the additional
TRA to ACP countries with a view to increasing the share of overallTRA allo-
cated to the ACP.
• The strategy should include a political commitment on the part of the EU
to strengthen its support for trade-related infrastructure, productive cap-
acity and trade-related adjustment, starting by supporting good coverage
of such wider issues in trade needs assessments. | 79 Monitoring and reporting 
• The strategy should support, as a priority, integration of trade-related con-
cerns into ACP national development strategies.
• The strategy should outline how to strengthen support to regional trade
needs assessments, in support of regional integration. In the EPA context,
this includes a particular emphasis on the EPA Regional Preparatory Task
Forces.
• The strategy should underline the commitment of the EU to applying aid
effectiveness principles at the regional level by supporting regional part-
ners’ capacity to own and lead Aid for Trade, coordinating programming,
pursuing more streamlined delivery modes and enhancing cooperation
with other donors. 
• The strategy should indicate a priority to EPA regions as regards coordinat-
ing delivery modes and supporting regionally owned initiatives, such as
regional EPA funds.
6. Monitoring and reporting
Monitoring and reporting are the keyto making progressin the areasdiscussed
above. Both processmonitoring and outcome monitoring isnecessary, accord-
ing to criteria to be agreed. The globalmonitoring and reporting foreseen within
the WTO/OECD framework and the EU level monitoring of implementation of
the EU Aid for Trade strategy are closely interlinked. 
Monitoring and reporting at the global level
The globalreview mechanism proposed bythe WTO TaskForce on Aid for Trade
should assess Aid for Trade delivery both quantitatively and qualitatively:
• Quantitatively: Monitoring should include global Aid for Trade flows as
reported to the WTO/OECD by donors plus reports by beneficiaries on the
implementation oftheir trade capacitybuilding strategies. The Commission
doesnotintend to duplicate the WTO/OECD workin compiling quantitative
data on Aid for Trade but could, with the Member States, use the existing
data for analysis at EU level to deepen understanding of efforts already
made and planned. 80 | Towards an EU Aid for Trade strategy – the Commission's contribution
• Qualitatively: The global review should also provide a platform for dis-
cussing all issues relevant to the effectiveness of Aid for Trade, building
international consensus on these issues, and exchanging experience
between donor and partner countries. It should monitor adherence to
agreed processes recognised important to aid effectiveness, and out-
comes. Monitoring should support results-based management of Aid for
Trade, in particular by promoting development of clear and measurable
objectives and indicators. Impacts on poverty deserve special attention.
The review mechanism should also help increase understanding of the
mostefficientwaysofspending fundson Aid for Trade, including the nexus
between domestic markets, demand and institutional capacities, and the
ability of developing countries to participate in international trade, the
importance of the policy framework, the sequencing of trade liberalisation
and Aid for Trade, the best way of integrating Trade issues into poverty
reduction strategies etc. 
Support for beneficiary countries' own monitoring and evaluation frameworks
for Aid for Trade will be crucial.
Monitoring and reporting at EU level
The EU will need to report on implementation of the EU Aid for Trade strategy,
for example to the European Parliament. Progress on implementing the EU
strategy should be assessed yearly by the Council, on the basis of a progress
report by the Commission and Member States. Joint programme evaluations
should be promoted. If necessary, the strategy should be adjusted.
Commission recommendations 
• The EU strategy should actively contribute to monitoring and reporting at
global level, including by supporting developing countries in their report-
ing and monitoring.
• The strategy should assist in streamlining Commission and Member States
reporting of quantitative Aid for Trade flows to the Doha database so that
the data can be used for deeper analysis at EU level. | 81 EU capacity for Aid for Trade
• The EU strategy should lay down action to support results-based manage-
ment and commit the EU to carry out annual joint programme evaluations
in the area of Aid for Trade in order to assess progress in the priority areas
of the EU strategy and in those agreed internationally.
7. EU capacity for Aid for Trade
Building human capacity in donor organisations, both at headquarters and in
the field is a precondition for scaling up Aid for Trade. Without this capacity,
trade will figure less prominently in the policy dialogue and donor organisa-
tions will find it more difficult to respond to the needs of partner countries.
Capacity means both numbers of staff and skills.
The specific needs to scale up capacity will differ between Member States and
depend on the manner in which Member States have chosen to expand their
Aid for Trade. Implementing the aid effectivenessagenda willbe staff-intensive.
However, sharing expertise could also help to reduce the need for an increase
in human resources in the field.
Commission recommendations 
• The Commission recommendstaking stockofthe EU'sexisting Aid for Trade
capacity and expertise. 
• The EU strategy should explore joint EU initiatives to develop and share
expertise, such as trainings on Aid for Trade.82 || 83
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The EU is the biggest aid donor in the world, and its share of total ODA is grow-
ing. It is taking long-term, far-reaching commitments on development finance
and their timely delivery to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDG):
• In 2002 the EU committed to a target of 0.39% of their combined Gross
National Income (GNI) to Official Development Assistance (ODA) by 2006.
In 2006 the EU not just met but exceeded this target increasing their ODA
to 0.42% of GNI and by disbursing, in 2006, a record high of€48 billion(
1).
In 2005 Africa received the most substantial part of EU aid. Overall one
third of EU ODA was used for social and administrative infrastructure to
fight poverty and 10% for humanitarian assistance.
• In 2005 the EU set further targets of collectively 0.56% ODA/ GNI by 2010
to bridge the financing gap for finally attaining the 0.7% ODA/ GNI goal by
2015(
2). These historic EU commitments account for almost 80% of prom-
ised G8 aid increases for Africa. The EU is on track to meet both.
• One Member State dedicated in 2006 just over 1% of its GNI to ODA. Three
others reached over 0.8% ODA/GNI. Other Member States, who seemed to
be off track just few years ago have scaled up their aid substantially.
The ten Member States who adhered to the EU in 2004 have collectively
doubled their aid since their accession.
• The Union also leads the international Financing for Development process
because it is already implementing aid better and faster. In addition to
signing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness the EU has introduced
joint analyses and multi-annual strategic planning of country assistance
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(1) In order to collectively provide, by 2006, at least 0.39% of the EU GNI as ODA, Member States
committed to increase their ODA; those with ODA of 0.7% ODA/ GNI committed to maintain the
high levels; all other Member States committed to achieve at least 0.33% ODA/GNI.
(2) The second intermediate collective target for 2010 is based on individual baseline targets, i.e.
Member States that have not yet reached an ODA of 0.51% of their GNI undertake to reach that
level; Member States undertake to achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI target by 2015 and those which
have achieved that goal commit themselves to remain above that target; Member States that
joined the EU after 2002 strive to achieve or maintain, by 2010, a minimum of 0.17% ODA/GNI
and of 0.33% by 2015. This commitment is combined with the promise to provide collectively
at least 50% of the agreed ODA increase to Africa86 | Keeping Europe's promises on Financing for Development
provided bythe ECand the Member States(
3) and isin the processofagree-
ing an EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy(
4).
However, this progress cannot be taken for granted and should not hide cer-
tain issues, specifically:
• big variations in aid budgets between Member States;
• the use of one off measures which sometimes disguise the overall trend in
aid volumes;
• the need for more effective aid disbursement to ensure that it reaches
those who need it.
The Commission herebypresentsitsfifth annualreporton EU progresstowards
implementing the historic commitments agreed in 2002 ahead of the
Monterrey Conference and further shaped by the European Council prior to the
UN World Summit in 2005 to accelerate progress towards the MDG(
5). The EU
commitments are, moreover, core parts of the European Consensus for
Development. The UN High LevelDialogue on Financing for Developmentin late
2007, the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra and the
'Monterrey follow-up' conference to be held in Doha in 2008 will again discuss
how to scale up aid and to deliver aid more effectively and efficiently.
This Communication builds on the opinions of the 27 EU Member States (EU-
27) expressed in their responsesto the monitoring questionnaire oflate 2006.
A detailed analysisofthe surveyiscontained in the accompanying Commission
Staff Working Paper(
6).
(3) Council Conclusions of April 2006.  'Financing for Development and Aid Effectiveness: Delivering
more, better and faster'.
(4) Based on the Commission Communication COM(2007) 72, 28.2.2007.
(5) CouncilConclusionsofMay2005. 'Millennium DevelopmentGoals: EU Contribution to the Review
of the MDGs at the UN 2005 High Level Event'. The EU promises also comprise additional
commitmentsconcerning innovative sourcesoffinancing for development, debtreliefand Global
Public Goods, better coordinated and more effective aid, including more predictable aid
mechanisms, mitigation of exogenous shocks, aid untying and the reform of the international
financial institutions.
(6) Financing for Development from Monterrey 2002 to Doha 2008 - Progress report 2007 -
SEC(2007) 415.| 87 EU aid levels could reach record highs throughout 2006-2010
2. EU aid levels could reach record highs throughout
2006-2010
2.1. EU global performance surpassed its objectives while some 
Member States have yet to strengthen their efforts
The EU achieved its first intermediate collective ODA goal one year ahead of
schedule, i.e. in 2005, and confirmed its excellent performance in 2006: the
combined EU ODA of €48 billion represents an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.42%,
exceeding the 0.39% target. The collective outcome for the 15 Member States,
who alone subscribed to this target in 2002 (EU-15), was even more impres-
sive, as they reached 0.43% ODA/GNI. Undoubtedly debt relief to Iraq, Nigeria
and post-tsunami aid contributed to the peak of EU ODA in 2005-06.88 | Keeping Europe's promises on Financing for Development
Table 1: EU ODA levels 2004-2006
DA in € million at current prices. 
Coloured cells contain information supplied by Member Sttates, other cells are Commission data or
calculations. EU-12 total and EU-27 total GNI and ODA figures in 2004 and 2005 do not include the GNI
of BG and RO.
2004 2005 2006
ODA in  ODA in ODA in  ODA in ODA in  ODA in
million € % of GNI million € % of GNI million € % of GNI
Official Targets EU-15: 0.33
Austria 1 175 0.50 1 266 0.52 1 205 0.48
Belgium 1 178 0.40 1 580 0.52 1 568 0.50
Bulgaria NA NA NA NA 2 0.01
Cyprus 4 0.03 4 0.03 16 0.11
Czech Republic 87 0.11 109 0.11 124 0.12
Denmark 1 639 0.83 1 696 0.81 1 780 0.80
Estonia 4 0.04 5 0.05 8 0.07
Finland 547 0.36 726 0.46 658 0.39
France 6 820 0.41 8 067 0.47 8 324 0.47
Germany 6 064 0.27 8 112 0.36 8 247 0.36
Greece 258 0.15 309 0.17 306 0.16
Hungary 56 0.07 80 0.10 96 0.12
Ireland 489 0.39 578 0.42 794 0.53
Italy 1 982 0.14 4 096 0.29 2 926 0.20
Latvia 7 0.06 8 0.07 9 0.06
Lithuania 8 0.04 12 0.06 15 0.08
Luxembourg 190 0.86 206 0.86 232 0.89
Malta 8 0.18 7 0.17 7 0.15
The Netherlands 3 384 0.67 4 116 0.81 4 343 0.81
Poland 95 0.05 165 0.07 239 0.09
Portugal 830 0.59 303 0.21 312 0.21
Romania NA NA NA NA 3 0.00
Slovak Republic 23 0.07 45 0.12 44 0.10
Slovenia 25 0.10 30 0.11 35 0.12
Spain 1 962 0.24 2 428 0.27 3 028 0.32
Sweden 2 191 0.78 2 706 0.94 3 161 1.03
UK 6 339 0.36 8 662 0.47 10 049 0.52
EU 15 TOTAL 35 047 0.35 44 852 0.44 46 932 0.43
EU 10 TOTAL 316 0.07 467 0.09 592 0.10
EU 25 TOTAL 35 364 0.34 45 318 0.42 47 524 0.42
EU 27 TOTAL 47 529 0.41EU aid levels could reach record highs throughout 2006-2010
The front-runners ensuring the EU’s success are the nine Member States that
have either achieved the 0.7% target or decided to reach it prior to 2015.
Particularly outstanding is the commitment of Sweden (SE) now allocating 1%
of its GNI to aid and Luxemburg (LU) that is set to follow by 2012. Member
States that registered much lower ODA levels a few years ago, e.g. Germany
(DE) and Spain (ES), have demonstrated that scaling up is possible when the
political will is there. Nevertheless Spain missed the 0.33% individual base-
line by€142 million. The 10 Member Statesthatjoined the EU in 2004 (the EU-
10) have doubled their ODA since the accession and have demonstrated their
commitment to the “acquis communautaire”.
The Union’s output would have been even more impressive if Greece (EL), Italy
(IT) and Portugal (PT) had also lived up to the agreed 0.33% ODA/GNI indi-
vidual target on time. They have pledged to catch up with the group by 2007
(EL, PT) and 2008 (IT), but their difficulties so far illustrates the general risk
entailed in “one-off” ODA boosts in single years (PT: ODA-counted debt relief
for Angola in 2004; IT: contribution to multilateral agencies in 2005) that are
not sustained by policy changes ensuring gradually growing aid budgets. To
avoid a widening gap between the Member States’ performance in delivering
on shared promises, continuing efforts are required by Member States trailing
below the minimum baselines.
2.2. Good prospect to reach the next milestone targets by 2010
In contrast with the global ODA outlookthat foresees lower aid levels in 2007-
2008 the Union'said levelsare expected to rise throughout2007–2010 in line
with the EU pledge for 2010. Improved economic growth prospects mean that
the EU could mobilise, an, extra €27–30 billion annually compared to 2006,
thus more than the initially projected €20 billion. The amounts that Member
States are forecasting remain vulnerable to GNI developments and might not
meet the targets. The forecast figures of several Member States are not yet
underpinned by clear year-on-year budget increases, but depend on ad hoc
developments. While debt relief grants have become instrumental in attaining
higher ODA levelsin the short-term and have, since 2005, constituted the lion's
share of aid from Austria (AT) at over 50%, France (FR), DE, IT and the UK (for
each around 1/3 of total ODA), they are insufficient over time. To maintain the
dynamics required to get to the 2010 targets an accelerated mobilisation of
programmable funds is warranted, including recourse to innovative sources of
financing, where necessary. PT – despite a planned impressive 148% ODA
increase in the period 2006-2010 – is not yet on track to meet the next EU
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individualtarget. Also, some ofthe EU-12 (the Member Statesthathave joined
since 2004) have yet to demonstrate how they intend to further increase their
aid volumes in the run-up to 2010.
Table 2: Forecasts and assumptions for achieving the 2007–2010 goals 
ODA in € million at current prices.
Source: coloured cells contain information supplied by Member States, other cells are Commission
data or calculations.
2007 2008 2009 2010
ODA in ODA in ODA in ODA in ODA in ODA in ODA in ODA in
million € % of GNI in million € % of GNI in million € % of GNI in million € % of GNI
Official Targets EU-15: 0.51
EU-10: 0.17
Austria 870 0.33 901 0.33 939 0.33 1 512 0.51
Belgium 1 799 0.55 2 030 0.59 2 288 0.64 2 561 0.68
Bulgaria 16 0.06 31 0.11 46 0.14 60 0.17
Cyprus 14 0.10 16 0.10 17 0.10 19 0.10
Czech Republic 128 0.11 147 0.12 171 0.13 230 0.17
Denmark 1 863 0.80 1 956 0.80 2 054 0.80 2 152 0.80
Estonia 9 0.07 11 0.07 13 0.07 15 0.07
Finland 746 0.42 796 0.43 870 0.46 1 395 0.70
France 9 180 0.49 10 581 0.54 11 982 0.59 13 383 0.63
Germany 9 426 0.40 10 605 0.43 11 784 0.47 12 963 0.51
Greece 683 0.33 799 0.36 1 057 0.45 1 262 0.51
Hungary 98 0.11 106 0.11 127 0.13 148 0.14
Ireland 813 0.51 942 0.55 1 018 0.55 1 199 0.60
Italy 4 072 0.27 5 218 0.33 6 974 0.42 8 730 0.51
Latvia 10 0.06 13 0.06 16 0.07 19 0.07
Lithuania 19 0.07 23 0.08 26 0.08 40 0.11
Luxembourg 254 0.90 274 0.91 300 0.92 336 0.95
Malta 8 0.17 9 0.17 9 0.17 9 0.17
The Netherlands 4 532 0.81 4 702 0.80 4 916 0.80 5 136 0.80
Poland 305 0.11 352 0.12 439 0.14 574 0.17
Portugal 517 0.33 588 0.37 660 0.39 768 0.44
Romania 59 0.05 115 0.10 171 0.14 228 0.17
Slovak Republic 57 0.12 69 0.14 82 0.16 95 0.17
Slovenia 40 0.13 46 0.14 52 0.15 64 0.17
Spain 4 305 0.42 5 464 0.50 6 524 0.56 7 676 0.62
Sweden 3 328 1.02 3 486 1.02 3 655 1.02 3 730 1.00
UK 9 572 0.46 11 156 0.52 12 740 0.56 14 324 0.60
EU 15 TOTAL 51 960 0.46 59 498 0.51 67 759 0.55 77 126 0,60
EU 10 TOTAL 765 0.10 938 0.11 1 168 0.13 1 499 0,16
EU 27 TOTAL 52 724 0.44 60 436 0.48 68 927 0.52 78 626 0,57EU aid levels could reach record highs throughout 2006-2010
2.3. On track to deliver on the UN goal for Least Developed Countries
(LDC) by 2010 
Further to the World Summit Outcome of 2005 and the Monterrey Consensus
all EU-15 countries either already allocate at least 0.15% ODA/GNI to LDC or
intend to reach thislevelby2010. Sixother Member Statesare willing to agree
to a minimum ODA share for LDCs. The nexus of support to the neediest (LDC,
aid “orphans”, fragile states), poverty reduction and the achievement of the
MDG will be centre-stage again at the Accra and Doha conferences of 2008.
2.4. Effective focus on Africa
Since 2002 Europe's annual aid to Africa has doubled and reached almost
€14billion in 2005. Almost half of the EU aid already goes to Africa, and half of
itsaid promised on top of2006 ODA volumesannuallyhasbeen pledged to the
continent as part of the EU-Africa strategy. When the OECD/DAC definite ODA
statistics 2006 become available later this year the Commission will establish a
baseline chart, against which future EU allocations to Africa can be assessed. In
line with the overall outlookon EU scaling-up of aid the outlookfor allocating an
additionalannual€ 10 billion or more ofcombined EU aid to Africa ispromising. 
2.5. But critical challenges need to be tackled
In order to further demonstrate thatthe EU keepsitspromiseson development
finance, and leads in delivering aid more effectively and efficiently the follow-
ing issues require attention:
• Longer-term predictability of aid flows is a prerequisite to achieving the
MDGs. While some Member States are acting on national plans to grad-
ually scale up their aid, the ODA flows of other Member States are more
volatile, in quantityor in composition. Againstthisbackground, itiscrucial
that all Member States establish national timetables, by the end of 2007,
to ensure gradually rising aid levels year-on-year.
• In particular those Member States that have neither reached the 2006
targets nor prepared for getting to 2010 milestones need to demonstrate
better how they will bridge the remaining gap in the spirit of securing fair
burden-sharing between Member States. Their undertakings should be
underpinned by redoubled outreach activities to win public opinion for
higher aid volumes. The Commission is ready to support this course. 
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• Additionality of debt relief: in 2005, the net ODA volumes excluding debt
relief grants of those three Member States that together represent 55% of
the EU's total aid, either decreased (DE –5.5%, FR –0.7%) or only margin-
ally increased (UK +0.9%). This seems to go against the Monterrey
Consensus and the Council Conclusions of April 2006(
7). 
• In order to ensure the comparability of aid volumes Member States need
to strengthen their ODA reporting capacitiesand methodology. CurrentEU
DACmembersshould callon the DACto adaptitsoutreach strategyaccord-
inglyin relation to emerging donorsnamelyto the 12 EU countriesthatare
not DAC members; the Commission can assist this process.
• Preparedness for efficient and effective use of rapidly rising aid volumes:
Member States will provide 90% of the additional EU aid bilaterally. As the
lion'sshare issupposed to be programmable aid, EU donorsmusturgently
review their structures and operative and aid modalities to deliver more
aid, better and faster. This process needs to include:
• national plans to strengthen capacity to implement scaled-up ODA,
otherwise scaling up remains a question of commitments, but dis-
bursement could lag behind;
• the speedy and practical application of the forthcoming EU Code of
Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy;
• increasing use of any different disbursement channels, such as com-
mon European instruments that emerge, as a result of the European
Consensus
–t o   implement joint policy objectives, such as the EU-Africa Strategy or
far-reaching EU Partnership/Association Agreements, for instance
through voluntarycontributionsto the EU TrustFund for Infrastructure
in Africa;
–t o   respond to global challenges, e.g. related to external shocks such
as climate change, natural disasters, commodity price variations or
major threats to public or animal health;
– to facilitate delivery of joint EU commitments, e.g. aid for trade;
and which contribute to enhancing the EU profile and visibilityin the world.
(7) Council Conclusions of April 2006, footnote 1 to paragraph 24.| 93 Slow but steady progress in implementing innovative sources of financing
3. Slow but steady progress in implementing 
innovative sources of financing
Progress in 2006 was based on considerable efforts by some EU Member
States which also attracted the participation of non-EU countries. FR and UK
decided to devote together estimated annualrevenuesofmore than €200 mil-
lion from an airline ticket tax for an International Drug Purchasing Facility
(UNITAID). UK, FR, IT, ES and SE (together with Norway) raised the first US$ 1
billion on capitalmarketsfor the InternationalFinance Facilityfor Immunization
(IFFIm) to vaccinate children. Recently, the UK and IT (together with Canada,
Norway, Russia and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) launched the first
Advance MarketCommitment (AMC) to speed up the development and market
introduction of a new vaccine for the pneumococcal disease in developing
countries; a further pilot for a malaria vaccine is being considered.
The new instruments provide stable and predictable sources of finance. Their
main advantage consistsin locking in long-term budgetarycommitments. This,
however, might entail additional transaction costs and require considerable
administrative and political efforts.
Most of the revenues arising from innovative mechanisms will be delivered
through existing channels and organisations that are experienced in working
in the health sector of developing countries. Although this avoids setting up
parallel structures, aligning these initiatives with partner countries’ health
strategies remains a challenge.
The vast majority of EU Member States are not considering effective participa-
tion in innovative sourcesin the foreseeable future, for either developmentpur-
poses or for global public goods.
The Commission encourages Member States that are currently not participat-
ing in anyofthe initiativesto continue analysing their effectivenesswith a view
to possibly broadening participation and mobilising additional and more
stable sources of finance. It also recalls that innovative sources cannot substi-
tute ODA and recommends that Member States' efforts in implementing inno-
vative sources of financing do not distract from other important priorities of
development finance.94 | Keeping Europe's promises on Financing for Development
4. Vigilance required to ensure continued 
debt sustainability in developing countries
In addition to the continuing impact of the extraordinary debt relief (Iraq,
Nigeria) the implementation of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative continued. The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) reinforces
efforts to further reduce HIPC debt by providing 100% cancellation of debt
stock vis-à-vis the International Development Association (IDA, WB), African
Development Fund and IMF, but does not cover outstanding loans from the
Inter-American and other regional Development Banks. The Commission
encouragesreinforced, internationallycoordinated endeavoursto supportlow-
income countries in their efforts to avoid unsustainable debt situations. These
undertakings should encompass improved debt management, include new
creditor countries in the debate on the debt sustainability framework and
address the free-rider problem (i.e. the possibility that debt relief cross-sub-
sidises lenders that offer non-concessional loans to post-HIPC countries). The
Commission proposes that the Council calls on the Member States to further
consider, in the appropriate international fora, on how to promote responsible
lending and borrowing, including by improving developing countries' debt
management and promoting dialogue with new lenders.
5. An EU Aid for Trade Strategy underscores
the commitments on trade and development
The Commission recommends that the Council and the European Parliament
support the proposals presented in the Communication 'Towards an EU Aid for
Trade strategy – the Commission’s contribution(
8).
(8) Commission Communication - COM(2007) 163, 4.4.2007.| 95 Aid effectiveness – EU to make better use of available tools
6. Aid effectiveness – 
EU to make better use of available tools
Aid effectiveness is at the forefront of the EU's policy agenda and is referred to
in all its initiatives. Since its adoption in 2006 most of the time-bound delive-
rables of the Aid Effectiveness Action Plan “Deliver more, better and faster”
have been initiated or completed:
(1) Joint multi-annual strategic planning shall be implemented, over time, in
all countries as a means to improve complementarity. In pursuance to the
CouncilConclusionsofApril2006, itstarted in ACP countrieswhere the pro-
gramming of the 10
th EDF has provided an opportunity to kick-start the
efforts toward joint programming with other donors in the field.
The experiences vary greatly as far as the state of progress and participa-
tion ofdonorsare concerned. Efficientcoordination mechanismshave facili-
tated the elaboration ofjointanalysisofcountrysituations. The drafting of
common response strategies is also progressively materialising in most
selected countries(
9) such as DRC, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Haiti, Kenya, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda
and Zambia. Based on the flexible and gradualnature ofjointprogramming
the processes are adapted to specific country situations and, where rele-
vant, use other processes such as Joint Assistance Strategies.
Due to the evolving nature of the process, these data are subject to con-
stant changes. However, they show that, despite some significant achieve-
ments, results have been hampered by the heterogeneous nature of
Member States’ programming mechanismsand the gap between positions
expressed by headquarters and at field level. In order to help overcoming
obstacles, provide technicalsupportand improve linksbetween headquar-
ters and field, the Commission has organised joint missions, e.g. in Haiti
and Somalia, and set up a specific network of EU experts.
(2) The Code of Conduct to promote the Division of Labour among EU donors
is expected to be adopted by the Council in May 2007.
(9) According to the Councilcriteria (CouncilConclusion 51): “a) the existence ofa PovertyReduction
Strategy or equivalent, b) the existence of a sufficient number of active EU donors, revising their
programming, c) the existence of local coordination processes, d) specific considerations for
fragile states, and e) a positive field assessment”.96 | Keeping Europe's promises on Financing for Development
(3) The first edition of the European Development Days was successfully held
in November 2006 and will now be held every year.
(4) A revised EU Donor Atlas, including first regional (West Africa) and country
(Mozambique) editions has been compiled.
(5) A baseline for the four additional EU commitments regarding the Paris
Declaration has been set, through an EU Roadmap exercise on harmon-
isation which reported on local processes on aid effectiveness. The
Commission restates its intention to meet the 50% objective for aid via
country systems through budget support.
(6) All obstacles to co-financing under EC rules have been removed.
7. Speedier progress required towards more predictable 
aid mechanisms
Budgetsupport, the recognised keyinstrumentfor ensuring medium-term, policy-
performance-based support to developing countries, remains a favoured
instrument for 13 Member States. Some are increasingly willing to consider
general budget support on top of sector budget support. The Commission is
developing the conceptofgeneralbudgetsupportasa possible wayto increase
aid predictability, incorporating clear eligibility criteria and a focus on results.
Budget support ought to be based on mechanisms ensuring ex post informa-
tion and accountability A possible arrangement could include longer-term
budget support, guaranteeing certain levels of annual support, subject to
safeguard clauses.
8. Mitigating the impact of exogenous shocks: 
stronger support by Member States is warranted 
to support emerging concepts
Increasing the resilience of developing countries to external economic shocks
(price vulnerability) and natural events (disasters, climate change and pan-
demics) is a common goal of EU development policy. In 2006 tools for this
were conceptualised and piloted, but they have attracted little attention and
progress remains limited.
• Revenue vulnerability: The Netherlands (NL) and the Community (EC) are
renewing their supportfor the CommodityRiskManagementGroup (CRMG)| 97
Mitigating the impact of exogenous shocks: 
stronger support by Member States is warranted to support emerging concepts
in the WB, which has shown that market-based instruments for risk reduc-
tion related to externalprice movementsare feasible. FR hasdeveloped risk
management initiatives for cotton and envisages piloting a new integrated
mechanism in selected countrieswithin an emerging jointdonor approach.
• “Disaster risk reduction” (DRR): In 2005-2006 the EU spent over €3.5 bil-
lion on disaster-related support, of which only an estimated three percent
wentto ex-ante assistance. Interestin broader strategicapproachesto dis-
aster preparednessisincreasing butmuch broader supportbythe Member
States is required. In order to offer a common approach in 2008 the
Commission will propose, a joint "EU strategy for DRR", building on avail-
able experience (e.g from the 9
th EDF Natural Disaster Facility) and aligned
with international initiatives.
• FLEX is the EC's mechanism for ACP countries aimed at safeguarding
reforms that could be put at risk as a result of short-term fluctuations in
export earnings. With a view to reinforcing its anti-cyclical nature, pro-
posals for making FLEX-assistance available earlier and more easily will be
discussed with Member States and the ACP group.
The Commission suggests that Member States
• strike a better balance between ex-post natural disaster responses and
ex-ante risk reduction strategies, based on a common EU approach to dis-
aster prevention/preparedness;
• strengthen support for piloting/ scaling up new instruments and methods
to reduce adverse effects of external shocks on developing countries, dis-
tinguishing between market-based answers to shocks resulting from inter-
nationalprice fluctuationsand effortsto mitigate shockscaused bynatural
disasters;
• actively participate in the International Task Force on Commodity Risk
Management to improve information exchange on novel risk management
approaches.98 | Keeping Europe's promises on Financing for Development
9. Untying aid: international developments lag 
behind EU progress
The EU isuntying more aid. The majorityofMember Statesthatare DACdonors
have (almost) fully untied their ODA. Others have introduced new measures to
further untie partoftheir aid. Some ofthe EU-10 have started to implementthe
DACRecommendation on untying aid to LDC. The increasing use ofbudgetsup-
port also contributes to the improved record of the Union's combined devel-
opmentassistance. Member Statesare encouraged to advance further towards
fully untying their aid.
Asthe ECinternalmarketrulesapplyto Member States' ODA, the Commission
reaffirmsitsdutyto pursue anyinfringementin thisregard. Member Statesthat
are in the process of building their development cooperation systems, namely
their procurement schemes, need to untie their aid in relation to all other
Member States.
In 2006 the EC translated its untying regulations into the new financial co-
operation instrumentsunder the ECbudget; in thiscontextthe supportto non-
state actors was also untied.
The Commission welcomes the extension of the scope of the DAC
Recommendation (through lowering the threshold for its application), after
years of impasse, and calls for further progress, i.e. to move from a trade
approach limited to the issue of reciprocal access between donors to a more
pro-poor approach centred on developing countries. This requires a further
extension of the DAC Recommendation (focus on access for developing coun-
tries; promotion of local preferences). The Commission points to the EU agree-
mentto further advance, within relevantinternationalfora, onuntying food aid
and food aid transport.| 99 Strengtheining the EU's influence in the international financial institutions (IFI)
10. Strengthening the EU’s influence 
in the international financial institutions (IFI)
Despite the varying pace ofprogress, the EU coordination within the World Bank
and the IMFhasadvanced. In particular EU Executive Directorsatthe World Bank
have so far issued around 40 joint statements in an informal coordination set-
ting and thussignificantlyaugmented EU visibilityand influence. Jointpositions
by EU Member States appear essential to further increasing the Union’s visibil-
ity and influence in the IFI. Improved EU coordination in the IFI mostly relies on
increased dialogue and information sharing. WB and IMF EU EDs meet weekly
to exchange views on Board topics and decide on common positions where
possible; the Commission is facilitating this coordination and aims to provide
further support. There is scope for improving the EU coordination at the IMF,
particularly in Washington.
The Commission also invited in 2007 the EU EDs of the three main regional
development banks (African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks) to
Brussels to improve coordination with the Commission and dialogue among
themselves. The meeting proved useful and will be regularly held.
The Commission also proposes
• to pursue systematic coordination meetings of EU EDs, with the
Commission participating, at the WB and the IMF with a view to adopting
common European statements on Board issues as often as possible;
• to improve EU coordination prior to the Spring/Annual Meetings; the
Commission stands ready to provide the necessary support;
• the exchange of information and documents between EU EDs and the
Commission, including timely and regular transmission of Board docu-
ments of the IFI (including regional development banks to the
Commission);
• to reinforce the European voice within the WB while at the same time
enhancing the voice of developing countries.100 | Keeping Europe's promises on Financing for Development
11. The EU confirms support for the global public goods
(GPG) but will not link actions to the recommendations
of the International Task Force
The Report of the International Task Force on GPG – Meeting Global Challenges
– was released in September 2006. Overall EU Member States' first reaction
seems to have suffered from delays in finalising the report and the low profile
itwasgiven. While mostlyaware ofthe report, Member Statesare notconvinced
itcontributed substantiallyto the debate on GPG. The Commission sympathises
with this perception, although it acknowledges the substantial analytical work
and consultations with a broad range of actors undertaken by the Task Force.
There is general agreement on the priority GPG identified by the Task Force,
especially for those related to health and the environment, but this support in
principle is not backed up by strong views on specific financing for GPG.
Most Member States agree on the need for a reformed UN system, consistent
with the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on UN System-wide
Coherence, to strengthen the transparency of its operations and overall
accountability; but there is not support for the report's key proposal for
improved global governance, i.e. the Global 25 forum.
The Task Force's strategy for financing GPG receives mixed support: a majority
of Member States is in favour of some proposals, which are plain and already
agreed internationally. Other more innovative recommendations, which
attempt to de-link GPG from development assistance, deserve attention, but
very few Member States support them. In view of the above and of the
Commission's own analysis of the report, it appears that the Task Force's pro-
posalsdo notcurrentlyattractsignificantEU interest. Establishing an EU Action
Plan for enhanced supply and financing of GPG at this point in time would
therefore be premature and ill-advised. Despite this assessment, the EU has
made notable progressto enhance the supplyofpriorityGPG, such asin health
and environmental matters, and it continues to take on the “responsible lead-
ership” role strongly argued for by the Task Force. The opportunity for an over-
arching initiative for GPG may be reassessed in the future.
Meanwhile, the Commission will strengthen its action on environmental GPG
through enhanced collaboration on alliance-building with developing coun-
tries. Thisenhanced collaboration aimsata second phase ofthe Kyoto Protocol
(post-2012) thatshould serve differentpurposes, e.g. be both compatible with
achieving the MDG and with limiting climate warming.| 101 Conclusions
12. Conclusions
The combined EU ODA results2006 exceeded expectations, butsome Member
States have yet to catch up and deliver agreed baseline aid levels. The overall
prospects for the EU's attaining the next milestone ODA targets by 2010 are
good, if core issues are addressed to sustain the EU's credibility as the largest
provider of development finance and if public opinion supports scaling up.
The speedy application of the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in
DevelopmentPolicyisthe bestopportunityfor a quantum leap in the effective-
ness of EU aid. The nexus of trade and development must be dealt with under
the joint EU Aid for Trade Strategy, which requires credible follow-up by all
stakeholders. Overall there is progress, at varying pace, on most of the EU
commitments, butgreater effortsare necessaryand more active Member State
participation is required in several areas, e.g. regarding budget support and
concepts to mitigate the impact of exogenous shocks.102 | Keeping Europe's promises on Financing for Development| 103104 | Keeping Europe's promises on Financing for DevelopmentThis brochure has been published in English and French  
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